NOTES

AND

ANNOTATIONS

ON

LOCKE

ON

THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING,

WRITTEN

By ORDER of the QUEEN;

CORRESPONDING IN SECTION AND PAGE WITH THE

EDITION OF 1793.

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PREFACE.

THE reputation of Mr. Locke is too well known to ſtand in need of any eulogium, and every publication tending to elucidate ſo valuable a production as his ESSAY on HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, cannot but excite the attention and be worthy the patronage of the *Literati*; more eſpecially ſo when iſſuing from the pen of Dr. Morell, of whom the late Lord Lyttelton has given the following pleaſing character:

" He certainly deſerves well of, and is
" eſteemed by, the learned world; but the acute
" critic and profound grammarian ſeems to be
" impelled rather by the love of ſcience, than
" the deſire of gain,—is generally in the habit
" of frugal contentment, and hides himſelf in
" that ſhade of retirement, where the learned
" few alone can find him. I am, however,

" entirely of opinion, that he merits a leſs re-
" ſtrained ſituation than he poſſeſſes; and I
" cannot forgive Dr. B—— for a breach of
" juſtice in oppoſing his election to a fellow-
" ſhip at Eton. Such a promotion would have
" been a ſuitable reward for his labours, and
" have afforded him that ample independence,
" and learned retreat, which would have left
" his cloſing life without a wiſh."*

The Doctor finiſhed his long, well-ſpent life with every tribute due to his memory, when, amongſt other manuſcripts in his own hand-writing, the following *ingenious production* was found; which, with a part of his valuable library, came into the poſſeſſion of the preſent Publiſher, where the *original* may be *ſeen*; and, with great propriety, may claim a place as an appendage to the works of Locke lately reprinted.

* See Lord Lyttelton's Letters.

NOTES

NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

ON

L O C K E

ON

THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

CORRESPONDING WITH

THE EDITION OF 1793.

BOOK I.

C H A P. I.

Introduction.

§ 8, *page* 6. IT is the *thing as it exiſts in the mind by way of conception or repreſentation*, that is properly called the *Idea*, whether the object be abſent or preſent.*

And accordingly he uſes it ſometimes for the thoughts or conceptions themſelves *in* the mind, and ſometimes for the things themſelves *without* the mind, that are the objects of its thoughts; and this often in the ſame ſentence, and without any diſtinction; which creates great difficulty in the underſtanding his meaning.†

There is no *idea* in the mind, but when it has ſome reſemblance, picture, image, or likeneſs of that which is without it, and never occurs but in that act of the

* Watts Log. p. 9. † Lee, p. 1.

mind which is commonly called *Imagination*; and therefore whenever it is uſed in any other ſenſe, it is *metaphorical* and *improper*.*

Page 7. Idea nomine intelligo cujuſlibet cogitationis formam illam, per cujus immediatam perceptionem ipſius cogitationis ejuſdem conſcius ſum. Adeo ut nihil poſſim verbis exprimere intelligendo id quod dico, quin ex hoc ipſo certum ſit, in me eſſe ideam ejus quod verbis illis ſignificatur. Atque ita non ſolas imagines in Phantaſia depictas ideas voco. imo ipſas hic nullo modo ideas voco, quatenus ſunt in Phantaſiâ corporea hoc eſt, in parte aliqua cerebri depicta, ſed quatenus mentem ipſam in illam cerebri partem converſam informant. This is very expreſs and full, agreeably to Mr. Locke's acceptation of the word idea.†

CHAP. II.

No Innate Principles in the Mind.

§ 1, *page* 13. BY *innate ſpeculative principles* are meant ſuch *general* truths as the mind in *all* its reaſonings, arguings, and judgements *always* and *neceſſarily* ſuppoſes true, as it does the truth of its own faculties.‡ They are called *Innate*, becauſe as ſoon as we perceive or judge at all, we cannot but judge their parts have the relation between them, as is expreſſed in them: *Speculative*, becauſe they do not immediately influence our external actions: *Principles*, becauſe all other propoſitions, which are more particular, or whoſe parts are leſs *common* names than they are, are and muſt be reſolved into *them*, or *identical* propoſitions as they are themſelves, or *negation* of that *identity*, before we can be certain of their truth.

* Lee, p. 1. † Baxt. N. p. 310.
‡ Watts Log. p. 8. Athen. Or. v. 2, 208. Vide Dialogues concerning Innate Principles, &c. 8vo. 1779. M. Rev. May, 1779.

And

And in this ſenſe only, I conceive, any thoughts or perceptions can be ſaid to be *innate*, viz. becauſe the powers or faculties of the mind to form ſuch thoughts or perceptions are derived from the Author of *Nature*, operating upon it by *neceſſary* cauſes; but the *actual* perceptions or thoughts muſt be owned to be *acquired*; becauſe they proceed from cauſes *extraneous* to the mind itſelf, and this I take to be all this author means, and therein I believe no one will differ from him. But it is to be obſerved on the other ſide, that beſides the *natural* capacities or powers of perceiving, affirming, doubting, &c. with which every intelligent is born, it is born alſo with a *native* aptneſs, inclination, or propenſity of *forming* ſome thoughts rather than others; of judging ſome propoſitions *true* rather than *falſe*; ſome actions *good* rather than *bad*; and this without the help of any *words* or any *teaching*. And ſuch thoughts and propoſitions we call *innate* or *natural*, though there be no ſuch *actual* thoughts or propoſitions born with the mind itſelf, or which it brings into the world with it. So *Tully* ſpeaking of ſelf-defence or ſelf-preſervation in favour of *Milo* ſays, *Eſt hæc non ſcripta, ſed* nata *lex*; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus: verum ex *naturâ* ipſâ arripuimus, hauſimus, expreſſimus; ad quam non docti, ſed facti; non inſtituti, ſed imbuti ſumus.*

§ 5, *page* 14. If there is any ſtrength in this argument, it is thrown away by the author himſelf: who plainly reckons embryos no other than vegetables, infants no better than brutes, and ideots a ſort of animals between men and brutes, and therefore if all, that *do* or *can* make any judgement, do judge theſe propoſitions true, then *univerſal* conſent is ſufficiently ſecured.†

* Lee. † Ibid. p. 7.

Implanted ſenſes, inſtincts, appetites, paſſions, and affections, are a remnant of the old philoſophy, which uſed to call every thing innate that it could not account for; and therefore it is to be wiſhed they were in one ſenſe all eradicated; which was undoubtedly the aim of this excellent book: but it may be obſerved, that every argument built upon theſe ſenſes, &c. will be equally concluſive, whether they be implanted or acquired.*

§ 16, *page* 21. The reaſon of this is, becauſe he perceives the ſubject and predicate of the former propoſition to be the *ſame*, but not ſo in the greater number. For as for *ideas* he has no other of two and three than of nineteen and thirty-eight, i. e. none at all; we have no abſtract *idea* of any number whatever, not ſo much as of *unity*.†

§ 18, *page* 23. The *power* of perceiving the relation between the parts of all propoſitions, of the truth of which any one is certain, is equally *innate*; but when we come to exerciſe that power, the difference is as plainly diſcoverable as between perſons, temper, or frame of mind or body.‡

§ 19, *page* 24. *Such leſs, &c.* This I own to be right in all truths acquired by experience, and wholly by the ſenſes, but not in ſuch as are acquired by the mind's exerciſing of its *innate* power of judging and comparing; which does not wholly depend upon the information we receive by our *ſenſes*.§

§ 23, *page* 27. I anſwer, only the diſpoſition or aptneſs to judge of the truth of thoſe propoſitions

* Law on King. p. 88. † Lee, p. 9.
‡ Lee, p. 10. § Ibid. p. 9.

rather than the contrary, or to doubt of them, and that is enough to give the propoſitions that title, without actual perception of the *particulars*.*

§ 27, *page* 30. Children are not *conſcious* of, or do not remember theſe principles, yet all their actions are governed by them, and which argues a ſenſe or knowledge of them.†

§ 28, *page* 32. All theſe arguments are ſo far from convincing me that there are no truths but what are *acquired*, (for that is the whole drift of this chapter) that as it is in painting, and all ſorts of manufactures, the nearer they come to the imitation of nature, ſo in all *acquired*, the nearer they come to thoſe *innate* or *natural* truths, the clearer or more certain perception of *identity*, or its *negation*, is the meaſure of *certainty*, not the agreement or diſagreement in *ideas*.‡

CHAP. III.

No Innate Practical Principles.

§ 1, *page* 33. BY *innate practical principles* are meant ſuch propoſitions as contain an *immutable obligation* upon all ſingle perſons and ſocieties to conform their *practices* to the ſenſe of them. They are called *practical*, becauſe they influence external actions; *propoſitions*, becauſe they have all the eſſential parts of a propoſition, viz. ſubject, predicate, and copula. They are likewiſe called *laws*, becauſe they have all the eſſential parts of a *law*, authority, promulgation, ſanction. *Promulgation*, becauſe every one that can judge at all, or can do good or harm, judges them true: *Authority*, becauſe impreſſed on our minds by the Author of Nature: *Sanction*, becauſe rewards or puniſh-

* Lee, p. 8. † Ibid. p. 10. ‡ Ibid. p. 11.

ments are *naturally* entailed upon the obſervance or non-obſervance of them.*

§ 1, *page* 33. All *moral* rules are as generally and readily aſſented to as any *ſelf-evident ſpeculative* principles; and the reaſon they have not a conſtant effect is, becauſe ſome paſſions or other overpower thoſe *natural* inclinations, but do not deſtroy them, no more than other bodies deſtroy the natural *conatus* of heavy bodies to deſcend, though they hinder the effect at preſent.†

§ 2, *page* 34. If *convenience* be ſuch an inſeparable and remarkable conſequence of the obſervance of that rule, that the worſt of men ſee it is their intereſt to obſerve it; this, one would think, was a good argument, that the connexion between the obſervance of that rule, and that effect of it, was *natural*, and therefore deſervedly reckoned a *law of nature*.‡

§ 3, *page* 34. This objection would be of great weight, if men were *pure ſpirits*, or only the maſterpiece of *mechaniſm*; but as they are *free* agents, and have a ſenſe of their own, of moving their own and other bodies within certain limits, &c. I cannot ſee any neceſſity that their *actions* ſhould be the conſtant interpreters of their *thoughts*, or why they may not act contrary to thoſe *innate* principles of knowledge which they have, or by the violence of paſſion be hindered from attending to thoſe rules of action which they judge beſt. Neither is there any reaſon why the law of nature ſhould *neceſſarily* operate upon minds of men more than human laws, or why their not operating upon all perſons caſts a greater blemiſh on the Author of

* Ibid. p. 11. King de Orig. Mali. Sherlock on a Fut. St. p. 124. Pearſon on the Creed, p. 20. Puffend. Law of Nat. l. 2, c. 3. § 13. Sharrock de fin. p. 168. Cumb. de Leg. Nat.
† Lee, p. 13. ‡ Ibid. p. 15.

Nature,

Nature, as if he formed them to no purpoſe, than the non-obſervance of human laws by any ſubjects, derogates from the honour of the lawgivers.*

§ 4, *page* 35. There may be occaſion indeed to explain the words of a *practical* propoſition, (as there may of a *ſpeculative*); but there needs no argument to convince any unprejudiced perſon of the *fitneſs* of obſerving it, after he knows the ſenſe of the words.

This *practical* propoſition, *Do as you would be done unto*, carries its own evidence and reaſonableneſs with it: and though it wants *explacation*, yet needs no *proof*: for every one underſtands, that what is equal in one man's caſe is equal in another's.†

§ 3, *page* 36. The Chriſtian, Hobbiſt, and Heathen, may give different reaſons, and uſe *different* expreſſions to add new force to a law of nature; but needs *none* ſufficiently to convince an unprejudiced perſon of his obligation to obſerve it, but what the wiſe Author of Nature has ſuggeſted before. And their very agreeing to give *different* reaſons ſhews, that nature *operates equally* in them all, in diſpoſing them to uſe ſuch enforcements.‡

§ 6, *page* 36. The *profitableneſs* of virtue rather proves it is *innate*; for where an effect is *conſtant*, there the cauſe is the Author of Nature. We do not pretend that the laws of nature ſo *irreſiſtibly operate* as to make men wiſe and honeſt againſt their wills, but only *incline* them to be ſuch, for their own intereſt, ſecurity, and happineſs. *Hypocriſy* proves that it is moſt *natural* to be really good.§

§ 7, *page* 37. Men's actions convince us indeed that all men are not ſo good as to govern themſelves

* Lee, p. 16. † Ibid. p. 16. ‡ Ibid. p. 17. § Ibid. p. 18.

by the *natural* ſenſe they have of what is good: but not that thoſe perſons do not act contrary to their own conſciences, unleſs we can ſuppoſe every man as good as he *knows* himſelf obliged to be.*

§ 8, *page* 38. Education, cuſtom, company, and human laws, may add *new* force to the laws of nature; but if there be no foundations laid in the conſtitution of our natures, for the diſtinction between virtue and vice *antecedent* to them, I doubt they will prove but *weak* and *uncertain*, becauſe they will depend upon contingent cauſes; and the conſequence of this doctrine will prove very *dangerous* to the foundation of *morality* and *natural religion*. But though falſe notions in religion may go a great way to corrupt men's manners and tempers, yet we never heard of any that were ſo far corrupted as to own it lawful to kill an innocent perſon, or break any law of nature merely out of *conſcience*. It is not *conſcience*, (whatever is pretended) but ſome *irregular paſſion*, mingled with *religious phrenzy*, that oftentimes proves ſo venomous and miſchievous.†

§ 9, *page* 38. Admitting theſe practices to be true, yet they do not prove that theſe people were *wholly ignorant* of the laws of nature, only that they were ſuch monſters of men as not to *regard and attend* to them as they ought;‡ beſides, in all theſe inſtances, there is no mention of any laws of the country to oblige the people to theſe enormities. It is one thing *not to puniſh* or *allow* another to *command* or *reward*. But ſuppoſe they were commanded, yet that would not demonſtrate that they *knew no better*. There is a famous inſtance to the contrary in the *Romans* expedition againſt *Cyprus*. And therefore to make any of theſe practices

* Lee, p. 18. † Ibid. p. 19.
‡ See this objection anſwered in § 11.

a convincing

a convincing argument againſt *innate* principles of morality and religion, there muſt be proof, that the perſons who committed them were under no prejudices, under the power of no paſſions, fear, or hopes of more preſent advantages or diſadvantages than what nature ſuggeſts for the contrary practices.

For the whole ſtate of the queſtion is, not whether men *can* act contrary to theſe *principles* or not; for in that point there is no diſpute: nor whether they be ſtamped upon the ſouls of all men as ſoon as they are united to their bodies; that is an idle thing to talk for or againſt; but whether human nature be not ſo conſtituted by the wiſe Author of it, as to be more inclined to the obſervance of ſome rules of action, for the promoting their own, and the happineſs of mankind, than the breach of them; or in other words, whether all men, or any one man, is *free* from all *ſenſe* of duty, and *indifferent* to all ſorts of actions? And I appeal to the ſenſe of mankind, whether they do not feel, within themſelves, an *inclination* to one, and an *abhorrence* to the other ſort of actions, ſuch as are here mentioned; and this *abhorrence* I call natural conſcience, and is a demonſtration, that we are all born with an inclination to the obſervance of thoſe rules we call the laws of nature.*

§ 10, *page* 40. This may be owned true, and yet be no good proof that thoſe rules of morality are not founded in nature, unleſs it be proved, that thoſe people who do or have ſlighted them, have, all things conſidered, fared the *better* for it.†

§ 13, *page* 43. I allow there is ſuch a thing, which may be called a *moral ſenſe*, in the mind, which inclines a man to judge right, and eſpecially in the more general, plain, and obvious queries about virtue

* Lee, p. 21. † Ibid. p. 23.

and vice: But this moral ſenſe is ſtill the ſame thing: It is intelligence or reaſon itſelf, conſidered as capable of diſcerning, diſcourſing, or judging about moral ſubjects. And it contains the plain and general principles of morality, not explicitly as propoſitions, but only as native principles, and cannot but judge virtue to be fit, and vice unfit, for intelligent and ſocial creatures whom God hath made.*

§ 14, *page* 44. As for *practical* propoſitions there are ſo many of them as there are *moral* rules for *human* actions; in the obſervance of which, the natural happineſs of mankind in general, and of every individual perſon, all things conſidered, is promoted, and which every one does, and muſt know, that knows any thing. And we call them *the laws of nature*, becauſe, in the common courſe of the world, there are rewards or puniſhments annexed to the obſervance or breach of them, antecedent to human laws, and are therefore derivable from no leſs or other cauſe, than the Author of Nature, the cauſe of all neceſſary effects. And that there are ſuch *laws of nature*, is manifeſt from theſe reaſons:

1ſt, Were there no ſuch *immutable* laws of nature, antecedent to all human inſtitutions, all actions would be in themſelves *indifferent*.

2d, From the *conſciouſneſs* ſome emperors and princes have of their *evil* actions, when they knew themſelves out of the reach of human penalties.

3d, From nature's powerful efficacy in vicious perſons at the approach of death.

4th, Some laws of nature ſeem to have a deeper root than mere cuſtom, education, or the hopes of human rewards, or fears of human puniſhments, could plant; becauſe human laws themſelves derive their whole or

* Watts Eſſ. p. 111.

main

main ſtrength from thoſe very laws of nature, and are more or leſs valid as they are more or leſs agreeable to thoſe natural laws, or ſooner or later reſolved into them.*

CHAP. IV.

Other Conſiderations concerning Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical.

§ 1, *page* 55. THERE is no need of *ideas*, i. e. of an actual knowledge of preſent thoughts of the ſubject and predicate in general propoſitions, to the forming a certain judgement of their truth, but only a *readineſs* of mind to aſſent to them as ſoon as the things ſignified by the words are propoſed; and to form them into verbal propoſitions, as ſoon as the words are underſtood. And becauſe that *power* in the mind of comparing its own thoughts is *natural* to all intelligent beings, and that there is no need of the information of any of our ſenſes concerning all the particulars implied in thoſe *general* words, therefore ſuch propoſitions may be called *innate*.†

§ 2, page 55. As for children's not having *ideas*, or notions which *anſwer the terms which make up thoſe general propoſitions*, it is nothing to the purpoſe, for grown men cannot have any ſuch ideas. No man can have *ideas* of all the wholes in the world, and of all the parts of thoſe wholes; yet a child that knows, or can judge of any thing, can certainly know and judge, that all wholes are bigger than any one of its parts; and ſo of all other *innate* truths.‡

§ 8, page 57. By the *idea* of God is meant, the notion we have of a being diſtinct from ourſelves, and every other *finite* being; the infinitely wiſe, good,

* Lee, p. 14. † Ibid. p. 26. ‡ Ibid.

and powerful *Author* of *Nature*, or *primary* cauſe of all *neceſſary* effects in the univerſe. And ſuch an *idea*, or notion of God, may be called *innate*, becauſe it is formed in the minds of men, without any *teaching*, or *artificial* arguments, or ſo much as the knowledge of words, by the efficacy of natural cauſes operating upon us, and the unavoidable obſervation of ſuch effects as can proceed from no leſs or other cauſe, than ſuch as we all mean by the word *God*.*

The ancients recorded for Atheiſts, are *Protagoras*, *Diagoras*, *Melius*, *Theodorus Cyrenaicus*, &c. But *Tully*, in the very period in which he gives us their names, makes the *belief* of a God *natural* to all men, *quo omnes duce natura vehimur*; and *Seneca* ſays, mentiuntur qui dicunt ſe non ſentire Deum eſſe; nam etſi tibi affirment interdiu, noctu tamen, et ſibi dubitant. And Epicurus, that took ſo much pains to free himſelf and others of their *natural* fears of God, is repreſented by his cotemporaries, to have been one of the moſt *fearful* men in the world, of death, and the gods.

It is ſcarce poſſible to know the ſenſe of whole nations in their diſowning the exiſtence of God, or to know they had no name for the *natural* notion of God, unleſs we were to ſpeak with every ſingle perſon, or underſtood every ſingle word of their language, which is impracticable. Their having mean and unworthy thoughts of God, is no proof they had no thoughts of God any more than it does that our common people have none of the ſun, becauſe they judge it not much bigger than the crown of their hats.†

Deos eſſe inter alia ſic colligimus, quod omnibus de diis opinio inſita eſt; nec ulla gens uſquam eſt adeo extra leges moreſque projecta, ut non aliquos deos credat.‡

* Lee, p. 29. § 8, Baxt. 241. † Lee, p. 34. . ‡ Ep. 117.

§ 9, *page* 57. If every man did neceſſarily feel light and heat, as he is conſcious of his own exiſtence, then he would as naturally infer that there were ſome ſuch things as we call the ſun and fire, as he that is conſcious of his own exiſtence infers from thence the exiſtence of ſomething diſtinct from, and ſuperior to himſelf; and extending his thoughts to other effects of the viſible world, he enlarges his thoughts concerning the nature and perfections of God by ſuch *natural* and *unavoidable* impreſſions from external objects, without the help of teaching or words, as he may do of the fire or the ſun, by ſuch *natural* effects which come from ſuch cauſes.*

§ 14, *page* 98. However the Heathen world differed from each other in the nature and number of their inferior deities, and in their cuſtoms, languages, and modes of worſhip, yet they all agreed in this that there was *one God*, the cauſe or ſupreme Author of Nature, and of all happineſs and calamities, which is the moſt obvious and natural notion of God.†

§ 19, *page* 69. The ſimple ideas of light, colours, ſounds, &c. even all *ſenſible* qualities (or *ſecondary* qualities of bodies) though they are not immediately, actually and implicitly impreſſed at once upon the mind, at its firſt union to the body, yet they may in ſome ſenſe be called *innate*: for they ſeem given to the mind by a divine energy, or law of union between ſoul and body, appointed in the firſt creation of man. And this law operates, or begins its efficacy in all particular inſtances, as ſoon as thoſe ſenſible objects occur, which give occaſion to theſe ſenſible qualities and ideas to be firſt perceived by the mind.

So ſome principles of knowledge (though not explicit propoſitions) may be in a ſenſe *innate* alſo,—

* Lee, p. 34. † Ibid. p. 35.

though they are not actually inſcribed on the mind of man in its firſt formation, yet the very nature, make and frame of a rational mind is ſuch, that it cannot but judge according to ſuch axioms, as *whatſoever* acteth hath a being, &c. They are, (as Mr. Glanvil calls them) the very eſſentials of rationality: and if any one aſk how the ſoul came by them, I anſwer, as *quantity* did by length, breadth, and depth.*

Therefore I take the mind or ſoul of men not to be ſo perfectly indifferent to receive all impreſſions, as a raſa tabula, or white paper, &c.†

§ 20, *page* 69. It is full as eaſy to conceive how the Author of our Natures in the frame of our ſouls and bodies, may make it eaſy and natural to judge a propoſition true, as ſoon as the words of it are underſtood, though we had not before any *actual* knowledge of the ſubject and predicate, as it is to make us reperceive or remember any thing, which we have not in our thoughts at that inſtant.‡

BOOK II. CHAP. I.

Of Ideas, *in General, and their Original.*

§ 2, *page* 77. IT is commonly thought, that the minds of men come by all their knowledge either by the immediate exerciſe of their own *natural powers,* in their ſeveral manners of operation about their ſeveral objects: or 2, by teſtimony *human* or *divine.*

The 1ſt *natural* power is ſenſation, i. e. the perception of thoſe impreſſions which are made by *external* objects upon the ſeveral organs of the body framed for that purpoſe.

* Vide the Vanity of Dogmatizing, p. 81.
† Watts Eſſ. p. 106. ‡ Lee, p. 36.

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The 2d is *imagination,* or the power of exciting in our minds the idea of any ſort of object, which we have either ſeen ourſelves before, or has been repreſented by others as viſible or ſenſible.

The 3d is *underſtanding,* which is only the power of exciting in our minds, thoughts of things by articulate ſounds, words written, or other ſenſible marks, and by the diligent exerciſe of this we acquire *wiſdom.**

The 4th is the *natural* power of judging, i. e. the comparing of thoſe objects we have perceived or imagined, and by obſerving their agreement or diſagreement with one another, we form propoſitions either negative or affirmative, modal or general.

The 5th is that of *reaſoning,* which is the inferring the truth of *one* propoſition from *another,* by obſerving the relation in which either of the terms of one propoſition ſtands to another.

The 6th is *memory,* or the facility of thinking of a thing which we thought on before,† and the conſciouſneſs of what is thus perceived, imagined, underſtood, compared, inferred, or remembered, is what moſt men call *knowing,* or in the general ſenſe of the *underſtanding.*‡

§ 3, 4, vide note on § 24, *p.* 91, concerning ſenſation and reflection, *page* 78. Though the firſt original of ideas may be entirely owing to theſe two principles, ſenſation and reflection; yet the recollection and freſh excitation of them may be owing to a thouſand other occaſions and occurrences in life.§

We obtain the knowledge of a multitude of propoſitions as well as of ſingle ideas by thoſe two principles which Mr. Locke calls ſenſe and reflection.‖ One of them is a ſort of conſciouſneſs of what affects the body, and the other of what affects the mind. Propoſitions

* Proceed. of the Underſt. b. 3, c. 4. Jac. *Ode* Theol. Nat. p. 39. Watts Eſſ. p. 115.
† Vide Watts Eſſ. p. 75. ‡ Lee, p. 40.
§ Watts Log. p. 30. ‖ Watts Eſſ. p. 75.

which

which are built on this internal conſciouſneſs, have yet no particular or diſtinguiſhing name aſſigned to them.*

§ 5, *page* 79. The firſt of theſe propoſitions is clear enough: the ſecond is not ſo. By the *mind*, he muſt mean the *thinking ſubſtance*; by the *underſtanding*, the *perceptive faculty*; by *ideas*, *perceptions*; by *operations*, the *actions* and *paſſions* of the mind. So that in the other propoſition runs thus, the *thinking ſubſtance* furniſhes the *thinking faculty* with the thoughts of its own thoughts: by all which he intends no more than this, that the mind is conſcious of its own actions and paſſions.†

§ 6, *page* 79. But it is as obſervable, that as the objects increaſe upon them in variety, ſo the power of perceiving them does, and that power has another ſource beſides the *objects* themſelves: unleſs what we call *perception*, as in the mind, be nothing but what we call *motion* in the object.‡

§ 7, *page* 80. No one doubts this; but the queſtion is, whether the *perceptive faculties* grow or be multiplied *purely* by the efficacy of the objects themſelves, or acquired only from that cauſe, or a ſuperior? Though the brain be the organ of the memory, yet it does not itſelf any more remember than the eye ſees: and whatever motions may precede, accompany or follow imagination and reaſoning; yet if there be not ſome one certain ſubſtance, call it the ſoul or what you pleaſe, that perceives all theſe various motions, that unites thoſe various perceptions, that compares them upon occaſion, that is conſcious of all theſe tranſactions, they would periſh the next moment, and the mind itſelf would be no more capable of *variety* in knowledge,

* Watts Log. p. 179. † Lee, p. 44. ‡ Ibid.

than

than a piece of ſoft wax is of *different* impreſſions at the *ſame* inſtant.*

§ 10, *page* 81. *That actual thinking, &c.* The ſtrength of all the *Carteſian* arguments to prove that *thinking* includes the *eſſential* or *diſtinguiſhing* property of a ſpirit, may be reduced to this one ſyllogiſm, and will be very difficult to find a reaſon to deny either of the propoſitions.†

That *with* which we may have a *clear* and *diſtinct* notion of a ſpirit, and *without* which we can have *no* notion of it at all, is the *eſſential* property of a ſpirit.

But *thinking* is that *with* which, &c.—*Ergo*,

§ 10, *page* 81. It is very improper to refer to *experience* in this caſe,‡ viz. for the reality of a ſtate, which by ſuppoſition is an utter negation of all experience.

§ 10, *page* 81, *line* 11. But with ſubmiſſion, there is this material difference, motion is no more the action of matter than reſt is, it is equally inactive in both. Matter ſtands in need of an external cauſe to put it in motion or bring it to reſt again, but the ſoul does not want an external mover to ſet it a thinking. And therefore there is no room to run a compariſon between the action of the ſoul, which neceſſarily ſprings out of its own nature, and the motion of matter, which muſt be excited in it by ſome being not material. This looks as if action was really extrinſic to them both; or as if it were as natural for the ſoul to be without action, as for matter to be without motion, which is to pervert our juſteſt conceptions of ſpiritual ſubſtance.§

If we *take away from our idea*, or deny activity and perceptivity concerning ſpiritual ſubſtance, by which we can only collect it to be a ſubſtance, we deny every

* Lee, p. 44. † Vide Baxt. p. 144, 152. Vide Inf. 154.
‡ Vide Infr. p. 184. Baxt. p. 145. § Ibid. p. 146.

thing we know concerning it, or we deny ourſelves to have any idea of it; and reaſoning about it as without thoſe powers, we reaſon preciſely about nothing, of which we have any particular idea. To ſay it may ſtill be a ſubſtance without theſe powers, is to ſuppoſe it *dead ſubſtance*, which could never come to the exerciſe of theſe powers again, if it had once loſt them, as we ſee it doth. And therefore it can never be without them.*

Beſides allowing Mr. Locke's acceptation of the word eſſence (3, 3, 15) it will not follow that every thing is ſeparable from ſubſtances, which is not this real internal conſtitution as he ſeems to take for granted. The properties that immediately flow from the internal conſtitution of things are as inſeparable from them as that conſtitution itſelf, and we can as little conceive the thing without theſe properties, as without that conſtitution.†

§ 10, *page* 81. *I confeſs myſelf, &c.* This *modeſty*, which is deſigned for an argument, is ſomewhat inaccurate, for he confeſſes a thing for certain which he can never be certain of. It is not in the power of the ſoul to become impercipient of ideas at pleaſure; and were the thing effected, it would be the ſign of an ill-diſpoſed body, and not of the dullneſs of the ſoul.

It is true the argument is good, that a man cannot think at any time, waking or ſleeping, without being ſenſible of it, but this reſpects the preſent time, and is far from concluding that a man cannot think ſleeping or waking without retaining the memory of ſuch thoughts, which yet is the thing deſigned to be concluded by it. Why elſe ſhould experience be alledged, which is the memory of things paſt?‡

§ 10, *page* 81. *But I do ſay, &c.* This ſeems to be granting the inference he ſo much dreads; for if the

* Baxt. p. 145. † Ibid. p. 146. ‡ Ibid. p. 148.

ſoul

ſoul does not *think* when the man is aſleep, we can have no reaſon to ſay that it *exiſts*; becauſe we ſay that of a thing of which we have *no notion* at all, we ſay ſomething of that of which, ſo far as we know, is *nothing*; and *nihili nullæ ſunt affectiones.**

§ 10, *page* 81. The queſtion here is rather about a matter of *not fact*, about a negation of all fact. Every body allows we are generally conſcious. It is abſurd to ſay, we forget our unconſciouſneſs, or we remember our unconſciouſneſs. Where is the matter of fact to be teſtified to them; or how is experience applicable? Let a definition of experience be given.†

§ 10, *page* 81. *It is hardly to be conceived that, &c.* If this argument proved any thing, it would prove too much; for it would prove, *we never dream.* For, I preſume, all men's dreams are alike incoherent and *uſeleſs*; but ſuch as they are, they are of uſe to prove, we may have *uſeleſs* thoughts, without any affront to the Majeſty of our Creator.‡

§ 11, *page* 83. Sleep not an affection of the whole man.§

The ſoul acts not by itſelf ſo as to be a different perſon.‖

§ 11, *page* 83. As to *conſciouſneſs*, it is impoſſible to prove or diſprove it directly. It is probable that the mind, though there be a ceſſation of the *external* organs of *ſenſe*, may perceive a conſtant *pleaſure* in ſound ſleep, from the perpetual *ſtream of ſpirits* that are riſing from the circulation of the blood, eſpecially ſince that motion muſt needs be even and regular in ſound ſleep, or from other cauſes: and people ſuddenly

* Lee, p. 45. † Baxt. p. 148. Vide p. 184. ‡ Lee, p. 47.
§ Baxt. p. 199. ‖ Ibid. p. 291.

awakened find a kind of *reluctancy*, at that inſtant, to be deprived of that *pleaſure*. This I confeſs cannot be demonſtrated, but much leſs the contrary; and there is this to be added to the probability of it, that our very dreams which we do remember, and the imagination we often have in them of *viſible* objects, much *clearer* than awake, do manifeſtly evince that the perceptive principle in us does not wholly depend upon the external ſenſes, for the exerciſe of all its natural powers; but can perform ſome of them without ſuch a monitor, eſpecially without being rid by the violence of *external* objects.*

§ 11, *page* 83. Who can ſay that he ever found himſelf in a ſtate of unconſciouſneſs? It is contradictory that any man ſhould ſo ſurprize himſelf with reſpect to the time preſent; and as to the paſt time, he cannot have any memory of ſuch a ſtate; for whether ever ſuch a ſtate was or was not, it is either way a contradiction that he ſhould remember it, and he cannot bring an argument for it from his not remembering of it. He did not perceive an abſence of conſciouſneſs then; nor can he now: ſince he could only do it by remembrance. He hath not two diſtinct conſciouſneſſes, one to be extinguiſhed, and another remaining to perceive the abſence of the firſt.†

It is ſtrange if any man put him to the trouble of confuting this contradiction, with the ſuppoſition of Caſtor and Pollux, Socrates and Plato. The poſition his adverſaries maintain, infers no ſuch contradiction, nor juſtifies another to infer it for them. There is certainly a great deal of our paſt conſciouſneſs, which we retain no memory of afterward. It is a particular mark of our finite and imperfect natures, that we cannot become conſcious of all our paſt conſciouſneſs at pleaſure. But no man at night would infer, that he was not in a ſtate of conſciouſneſs and thinking at ſuch

* Lee, p. 46. † Vide Baxt. p. 147.

a certain time of day, becauſe now, perhaps, he hath no memory what particular thought he had at that minute. And it is no better argument conſidered in itſelf, that a man was not conſcious at ſuch a minute in his ſleep, becauſe next morning he hath no memory of what ideas were in his mind then.*

§ 11, *page* 83. It is here granted, that while we are awake, we are under the neceſſity of thinking; how comes it then we are not always awake? Is it the defect of the ſoul? This was the chief point to be conſidered. But ſpirit hath no parts, and therefore ſtands in no need of reparation or re-diſpoſing its parts aright, as the body doth, which conſiſts of parts which are conſtantly changing, and liable to be diſordered; this ſhews on which ſide the indiſpoſition lies.†

§ 12, *page* 84. A man aſleep may perceive, or think, and be conſcious of it at that inſtant, and yet not retain the thoughts of it when awake; and that too without being, to all effects and purpoſes, two different perſons for want of that memory. For if the want of memory was a ſufficient reaſon to make different perſons, then the ſame man might be an hundred men in the ſame day, by forgetting his ſeveral ſucceeding thoughts within that time. The ſuppoſition therefore of Caſtor's ſoul in Pollux's body while aſleep, is a little too romantic; but it is levelled againſt the belief of ſome that the ſoul is a diſtinct ſubſtance from the body, and therefore, as he infers, may act apart; but as diſtinct ſubſtances as they are, yet there is a mutual communication between the *thoughts* of the ſoul and the *motions* of the body;‡ but the ſoul of one man can no more be in another man's body than one man can be conſcious of another's thoughts, or feel his pain with the gout.§

* Vide Baxt. p. 149. † Ibid. p. 75.
‡ Baxt. p. 115. § Lee, p. 47.

§ 12, *page* 84. When we fall heavy with ſleep, or ſink from waking to a ſleeping ſtate, we loſe gradually the perception of external objects or whatever we were thinking of, as the mind ceaſes to be active in applying the attention to them, till all degenerates into an internal ſcene of thinking, where the mind is ſtill active, and perceptive of and about other objects.*

I cannot help being concerned to find ſome great and learned men taking the wrong ſide of ambiguous appearances, and falling in with the ſceptical notions of the world, by inſinuating, that the ſoul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body; and this in order to maintain another hypotheſis of no very great conſequence in itſelf though it were true in this ſtate of union, viz. that the ſoul thinks not always, which yet is not eaſily to be proved, even though the activity of ſpirit be clogged with dead matter, and is certainly falſe in a ſtate of ſeparation.†

§ 14, *page* 85. If we conſider the temper of the brain, while we are faſt aſleep, partly by the plentiful reſort of the animal ſpirits which uſed to be otherwiſe employed, partly by the continual recruit which ſleep was deſigned to make; it cannot be conceived otherwiſe, but there muſt be a very quick ſucceſſion of thought, and continual interfering and croſſing of thoſe ſpirits in their motions, and thereby hindering one another from making any diſtinct impreſſions in the brain, which is doubtleſs the chief organ of memory. And what the variety of ſucceeding objects may do whilſt awake, that much more the various and multiform motion of the animal ſpirits may do whilſt aſleep. And let a man be never ſo ſuddenly awaked, the very concuſſion of the nerves (if by external violence) communicated to the brain may ſhatter, and confound and blot out, in that moment, all the impreſſions which the

* Baxt. p. 138. † Ibid. p. 142.

thoughts

thoughts had made before, and if awaked without any ſuch foreign force, the ſudden and haſty motion of the ſpirits to the external parts may work the like effect.*

§ 14, *page* 85. This objection is not rightly ſtated. It is not only poſſible, but eaſy to forget on being awakened, what we were dreaming the minute before. And due care being taken, it is certainly alſo not impoſſible to obſerve it in many caſes. A very remarkable author writing on this ſubject, ſaith, "I ſuppoſe the ſoul is never totally inactive. I never awaked ſince I had the uſe of my memory, but I found myſelf coming out of a dream. And I ſuppoſe they that think they dream not, think ſo becauſe they forget their dreams."†

§ 16, *page* 87. If the ſoul were indebted to matter for the perfection of rational thinking, matter would be the more perfect being of the two. And if thinking, or activity does not belong to the nature of immaterial ſubſtance; it muſt be merely accidental to all ſubſtance, which is no leſs abſurd.‡

Again, we have undoubted experience that the ſoul thinks and lives, while the ſenſes are ſhut up and can miniſter nothing; and laſtly, allowing all that is alledged, viz. that ſometimes we ſleep without dreaming, is it therefore to be inferred that ſleep is an affection of the ſoul? Is it not conceivable to any man of common ſenſe, that its activity may be quite hindered from being exerted, and its perceptivity entirely impeded, without ſuppoſing it to be laid up to be refitted, in ſleep, as the body is, or making ſleep an affection of a material being.§

In a dream, when it is certain that the ſoul is percipient and awake, it is yet not percipient of any external

* Baxt. p. 47. † Mr. R. B. on the Soul's Immortality.
‡ Baxt. p. 143. § Ibid. p. 153.

touch upon the body: Why? Becauſe the action is really not communicated to it. Hence is manifeſt on which ſide the indiſpoſition lies, and that ſleep is not an affection of the whole man, ſoul as well as body, as Mr. Locke inſinuates.*

§ 16, *page* 87. Here is a broad hint for material ſouls.—What is *for the moſt part only*, is not always; that ſide ought alſo to have been conſidered.† But the moſt incoherent of our dreams is an appearance far above matter, or any power matter can be endued with: and upon a narrow examination the actions properly of the ſoul in dreaming will not be found ſo irrational as is here preſumed, and generally conceived.‡

This abſurdity, (that the ſoul, &c.) is firſt made a conſequence of what theſe men ſay, and immediately it is ſurmiſed that the quality of our dreams ſhews this abſurdity to be fact.§ This is really a ſtrange way of proceeding, to ſhuffle over the odiouſneſs of an inſinuation upon, and in caſe they ſhould diſown it, and that circumſtance from which he would infer it (viz. that the ſoul thinks without being conſcious of it) to endeavour to prove it, by an appearance, which is ready at hand. Theſe men deny that the ſoul thinks leſs or more rationally, without being conſcious of it, and therefore any conſequence of ſuch a poſition; but who is it here that appeals to the frivolouſneſs and irrationality of dreams to ſhew that the ſoul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body. Mr. Locke ſhould have told us what were his own ſentiments of this affair; and if it were an abſurdity, ſhewn us how it was to be avoided; but firſt to endeavour to turn it over to his as ſomething very unjuſtifiable, which therefore ſhewed the abſurdity of their opinion, and then to endeavour to prove it, was altogether ſingular. Here he ſuppoſes

* Baxt. p. 155. † Ibid. p. 174, 181.
‡ Ibid. p. 143. § Ibid. 270, 274.

that

that the ſoul itſelf produces all it hears and ſees in ſleep, that it thinks apart and ſeparately at that time, and exerts the utmoſt perfection it is capable of, when deſtitute of the help of the body. How unjuſt and inaccurate a repreſentation of this appearance is this.*

This obſervation of Mr. Locke is ſo far from being exact, that if he had made juſt the contrary obſervation, it would have been equally true, which is remarkable enough in a man of his accuracy and judgement. Beſides, how could the ſoul upon Mr. Locke's own principles form to itſelf in ſleep a ſcene of our waking actions and thoughts, and the man be ſtill ignorant of it, without being two diſtinct perſons?† If a lawyer anſwers the objections of the oppoſite party in his ſleep, and if he made theſe objections againſt himſelf, ſhould he not be as conſcious that he made them, as that he made the anſwers to them? If objections are made, the efficiency of a rational intelligent cauſe is intereſted, from the nature of the inſtance: and if the perſon himſelf anſwers the objections, the ſoul reaſons ſometimes in ſleep, or *hath ideas under the conduct of the underſtanding*.‡

From our intimacy and acquaintance with this, viſion, however new and ſtrange to us, it is plain that the ſoul is capable of a more perfect and ready knowledge of things than that which it attains to now by the methods of ſenſe and reflection.§

§ 24, *page* 91. The reflecting of the mind upon its own operations can ſignify nothing to the increaſe of knowledge, unleſs we be improved in our knowledge of thoſe things on which we have thought. If the mind has not *innate* powers of carrying its thoughts further than the ſenſes, it will be never the better furniſhed by reflecting or viewing what it has gained thereby: the

* Baxt. p. 270. † Vide Lucret. 4, p. 960.
‡ Baxt. p. 276. § Ibid. p. 292.

operations themſelves will not afford a new ſet of *ideas*, for they are only the *modes of thinking* ſo named; of which we have no ideas at all, when abſtracted from the objects about which they are employed. And if this author means any thing more by *reflexion*, then it is the ſame which every body means by *knowing*, and it is very improper to reckon that to be a ſource of *knowledge*, which is *knowing itſelf*; and therefore he might as well have ſaid in *Gaſſendus's* words, *nihil eſt intellectu, quod non prius fuit in ſenſu*. And therefore what he is pleaſed to call *natural* muſt be *acquired* (if all knowledge be) from our *ſenſes* too. And if that be his meaning I conceive a *ſenſation*, an inadequate original of all knowledge, imperfect as it is, for theſe reaſons:

1ſt, Becauſe our external ſenſes do, or can give no true account, or near it, ſo much as of *corporeal* ſubſtances, or of any one of their *modes*.

2dly, Our *ſenſes* muſt be infinitely defective as to *immaterial* ſubſtances; for into them the ſenſes can give us no inſight at all.

3dly, There are ſeveral general propoſitions as certainly true, as that our faculties are not deceived, yet we can come at no knowledge of them *merely* by our ſenſes; becauſe they cannot reach to all the particulars included in the ſubjects of them.

And laſtly, There are ſome propoſitions as certainly true as that the ſun is a luminous body; and yet the terms which conſtitute them, cannot be underſtood by the ſenſes; as where the ſubject is a *negative*, *nihil nullæ ſunt affectiones*, or nothing cannot produce an effect. No one will ſay he has an *idea* of nothing by his *ſenſes*. Whatever *natural powers therefore the mind has, neither they* nor the exerciſe of them, can be derived from the ſenſation of external objects; but muſt come, by inſenſible ways, from the Author of nature in the conſtitution of our ſouls; and it is as rational to believe, that theſe *natural* powers are gradually imparted to

to the ſoul according to its ſucceſſive capacities to exerciſe them, as that the ſoul itſelf was at firſt *created* by the *infinitely-wiſe* Author.*

CHAP. II.

Of Simple IDEAS.

§ 1, *page* 93. *SOME of them are ſimple, &c.* But the better to underſtand this difference, he ſhould have given ſome mark or definition of them, that ſo we might diſtinguiſh them from one another.† But we muſt be content with amplification inſtead of definition, which is a tedious, and I fear we ſhall not find a ſafer way to knowledge.‡

Theſe qualities that affect our ſenſes, when in the mind, are mere perceptions, and thoſe perceptions have none of the features of the qualities themſelves, as he himſelf expreſsly owns, and therefore cannot with any propriety be called *ideas*, much leſs *ſimple ideas*.§

As a man ſees at once, &c. I queſtion whether the ſight can take in at once colour and motion diſtinctly; for though the ſucceſſion in the acts of perception are very quick, yet, I doubt, that if there were not diſtinct inſtants, the perceptions of them could never be ſo; however this is certain they can never be perceived diſtinctly from that body in which they are, and ſo are *complex perceptions*, or *ideas*.‖

A ſimple idea is one uniform idea, which cannot be divided or diſtinguiſhed by the mind of man into two or more ideas.¶

§ 3, *page* 96. What our author ſays is *poſſible*, ſeems moſt *certain*, that *ſuperior* intelligent beings have other

* Baxt. p. 43. † Vide Watts Log. p. 33. ‡ Lee, p. 48.
§ Lee, p. 48. ‖ Ibid. p. 49. ¶ Watts Log. p. 33.

organs for ſenſations than we have, and for memory than a *brain* ſuch as we have; otherwiſe it would be *naturally* impoſſible, that angels and ſouls ſeparated from their *preſent* bodies ſhould have any memory of their *paſt* actions, or perceptions of *greater* pleaſure or pain than we now have.*

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

§ 1, *page* 99. THE word Solid is generally uſed in contradiſtinction to hollowneſs, ſignifying conſiſtency, continuity, or mutual coherence of parts, and ſometimes hardneſs; which is no poſitive but a relative quality to the conſtitution of our bodies, and therefore not ſo fit to be ſet up for the eſſential property of a body as extenſion, which of late has had the name of it.†

§ 3, *page* 100. *Space* diſtinct from *Body*:‡ for *ſpace* ſeems to be the general name of what immediately affects our ſenſes only with extenſion: body, the general name of what affects our ſenſes with either figure, motion, or reſt, beſides extenſion.§

CHAP. V.

Of Simple IDEAS *of divers Senſes.*

Page 104. IF there be any ſpace beyond the confines of body, we cannot have ſo much as the *conception* of it, but only by the exerciſe of *reaſon*, inferring that there may be ſuch *ſpace*, becauſe we cannot

* Watts Log. p. 49. † Ibid. p. 50.
‡ Vide c. 13, § 11, p. 152. § Lee, p. 71.

imagine or invent any *external* cauſe that ſhould hinder the infinite extenſion of the univerſe, but that is not an idea, but a *rational* inference.*

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple IDEAS *of Reflection.*

§ 2, *page* 104. HOW *thinking* comes to be placed to *perception* only needs explication, for when we will love, hate, or deſire, we *think*, as well as when we underſtand, imagine, or judge.†

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple IDEAS *of both Senſation and Reflection.*

§ 1, *page* 105. BUT what notion can a man have of *pleaſure* or *pain* alone, I mean, without conſidering the *cauſes* of them, or *ſubjects* wherein they are? So that *pleaſure* and *pain* ſeem only the names of our perceptions; *power*, *unity*, and *exiſtence* the names only of the acts of the mind itſelf, exerciſed about things operating, exiſting, and being one, and not any abſtract *ideas* or *objects* of the mind.‡

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning our Simple IDEAS.

§ 1, *page* 109. THE cauſe of all perceptions is ſomething *real* or *poſitive*; for in plain Engliſh, a *privative* cauſe, or the *privation* of a cauſe, is *no cauſe* at all.§

* Lee, p. 53. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. p. 54. § Ibid.

§ 7, *page* 111, *line* 6. That ſo *we may not think*.—That the old philoſophers thought ſo, appears from their giving the ſame name to the *quality* in the body, that excites a ſenſation in us, and to the ſenſation excited as, *Calor in igne, homo Calidus.*

When a thought is raiſed in our mind by the action of ſome real thing without us, this *idea* is the effect of a *poſitive* cauſe: but it often happens that a new thought ſhall ariſe from the want of a real thing, or when it ceaſes to act; here is a *privative* cauſe.

§ 8, *page* 111. Idea, what.—The *form* under which things appear to the mind or the reſult of our conception or apprehenſion, is called an *idea.**

Which ideas. This uſe of the word *idea*, viz. for the quality producing it, will be apt to miſguide any one that does not remember this admonition.†

Primary qualities are ſuch as belong to bodies conſidered in themſelves, whether there was any man to take notice of them or no.‡

§ 11, *page* 113. In the act of *imagination* indeed, when the object is not preſent, there is an *idea* of the *viſible* object in the mind itſelf: but whether it be ſo, when the object is actually preſent, is not ſo evident; becauſe we cannot eaſily diſtinguiſh between the impreſſion which is properly the act of the *object*, and the perception which is the act of the *mind*.§ But this is certain, that there is at no time an idea or perception of any of thoſe qualities *without* the ſubject in which they are, and ſo there can be no ſuch things as *ſimple ideas*, they are all *compounded*.‖

Secondary qualities are ſuch ideas as we aſcribe to bodies on the account of various impreſſions which are made on the ſenſes of men by them.¶

* Watts Log. p. 5. † § 9, Ibid. p. 24. ‡ Ibid.
§ Watts Eſſ. p. 105. ‖ Lee, p. 56. ¶ Watts Log. p. 24.

§ 15,

§ 15, *page* 114, *line* 5. *But the ideas produced in us by theſe ſecondary qualities.* Becauſe when the *ideas of the ſecondary qualities* are produced, there is nothing more in the bodies, than when the *ideas of the primary qualities* were produced: there is only a determinate ſet, or combination of the *primary qualities*; there are no new affections anſwering theſe new thoughts in our minds; and this ſeems to be a more proper way of ſpeaking in this caſe: becauſe there is indeed no reſemblance between *the primary qualities* and our *ideas* of them, which are the modes of a different ſubſtance.

§ 19, *page* 116. The *ſuperficies* of bodies do for the moſt part modify the light that falls upon them, and ſo their *colour* ſeems to be conſtant: but it is oftentimes modified before it comes at them, and they reflect it to our eyes with that modification, and then their colour is altered; and this new colour is as much their colour while they continue in that poſture, as the other colour is at all other times.

CHAP. IX.

Of PERCEPTION.

§ 1, *page* 121. PERCEPTION is the immediate ſelf-conſciouſneſs of ideas in the mind, or of the natural relation of one or more ideas as exiſting in and appearing to the underſtanding.*

The word *perception* is ſeldom or never uſed for *thinking in general*; becauſe thinking comprehends the acts of the *will*, as well as the *underſtanding*; and the *will* was never reckoned among the perceptive faculties, though it has great influence in the improvement of them.†

* Mor. Phil. p. 193. † Ibid. p. 58.

Perception, conception, or apprehenſion is the mere ſimple contemplation of things offered to our mind, without affirming or denying any thing concerning them; the form under which theſe things appear to the mind, or the reſult of our conception, is called an *idea*.*

Perception is that act of the mind whereby it becomes conſcious of any thing, when preſent.†

§ 8, *page* 123, *line* 8. *Of a flat circle variouſly ſhadowed.* Becauſe the bottom of the eye being a *ſuperficies*, nothing but a *ſuperficies* can be there painted; and ſo all the ſolidity and thickneſs of bodies is loſt: ſo thoſe parts of a globe, which are directly oppoſite to the eye, and ſo on a parallel ſituation to it make the greateſt image in it, and conſequently the brighteſt and ſtrongeſt colour; whereas thoſe on either ſide, the further they go towards the tangent lines on the globe, the leſs images they make in the eye: as a circle, which was at firſt directly oppoſite and parallel to the eye by bending any way from it, makes at firſt the image of an *ellipſis*, and at laſt of a *line* only.

Where any body is more white, or otherwiſe enabled to reflect the light ſtrongly, the nearer it will appear, and the leſs luminous the farther off: the reaſon is, becauſe in the natural fabric of the eye, the nerves that are cauſed to move and thereby defend it againſt the more preſſing light, contract ſo as it is, and muſt be, to ſee an object that is very near: ſo that there is no need of *experience* to teach us that *ſhade* ſtands for *figure*; for the parts from which the ſhade comes will, by the ſtructure of the eye, appear further off than otherwiſe they would, and ſo the whole ſuperficies of the globe appear protuberant, as it really is.‡

Page 124, *line* 22. *Or that a protuberant angle.*— The inequality of the *angles* which preſſed his hand, is wholly

* Watts Log. p. 5. † Ibid. p. 8. ‡ Ibid. p. 60.

image of the eye; a *cube* making nothing but a *parallelogram*.

Quære, Whether he would not by nature know the difference? or in other words, whether there be not conſtituted in nature a neceſſary connexion between a certain motion upon the organ of touch, and a certain perception, and a certain figure at the bottom of the eye, and the ſame perception.*

§ 9, *page* 125, *line* 8. *We bring ourſelves to judge. &c.* in the inſtance he hath given, that the thing we ſee is of an uniform colour, though the *idea* we have in our mind, when we ſee it, is of a thing *variouſly ſhadowed*. We bring ourſelves to judge thus, by our having obſerved, that this idea hath been often produced in us by the convex figure of a globe of an *uniform colour*.

§ 14, *page* 127. The inſtance here given ſmells ſo ſtrong of a certain principle that man is nothing but an organized body, with the knack of *thinking* tacked to it at certain times, that it may be enough to awaken any one that is concerned for the *immortality of human ſouls*, to ſee the dangerous conſequence of it.†

CHAP. X.

Of RETENTION.

§ 2, *page* 128. *THERE is an ability in the mind, &c.* From hence ſome infer *innate* principles, though there be not an actual perception of the ſeveral parts of thoſe propoſitions, only a *natural* facility in the mind, to apprehend, connect, or disjoin them, when occaſion offers the thoughts of them, juſt as there is a *power* in the loadſtone to draw iron, before it *actually*

* Lee, p. 60. † Ibid. p. 61.

tually exerts that power, and that is all they mean by *natural* or *innate.**

§ 3, *page* 129. To theſe may be added *method*, by which things, that are a-kin to one another, may be ſo placed together in one conſideration, as to make our thoughts eaſily ſucceed one another in train.†

§ 7, *page* 131. I am apt to think it is always *active*, i. e. that there is an *action* required in the mind, *diſtinct* from the *effect* which the impreſſion left.‡ The act of the *memory* is as *diſtinct* from that which occaſions it, as *ſenſation* itſelf, from the *motion* which comes from the object.§

Memory, as we are active in it, is the power itſelf belonging to the ſoul, whereby it applies the perceptive capacity to the conſideration of any former object.

Memory, as we are paſſive in it, is only a thing being brought into the perception, with a ſecondary or concomitant perception, which diſtinguiſhes it from a new perception, and makes it appear only a perception renewed, or that it was there once at leaſt before.‖

§ 10, *page* 133. In this inſtance of birds, there is wanting ſomething of convincing evidence that they are *conſcious* of what they do. That the ſinging of ſome birds is in a great meaſure *mechanical*, is manifeſt from their ſinging more *briſkly* in a room where there is moſt walking, talking, or any ſort of *noiſy* motion.¶

* Lee, p. 62. † Ibid. ‡ Baxt. p. 289.
§ Lee, p. 63. ‖ Baxt. p. 290. ¶ Lee, p. 63.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of DISCERNING, *and other Operations of the Mind.*

§ 3, *page* 136, *line* 17. *THAT the ſame piece of ſugar, &c.* It is not true that the mind does at the *ſame time* perceive thoſe two qualities in the ſugar; it is at *different* times, as much as if they had been two different bodies, though they are in the ſame piece of ſugar.*

§ 5, *page* 137, *line* 14. *Belonging to general ideas.*—There are really no *general ſubſtances or modes*, and conſequently no *ideas* of general things; becauſe there is nothing properly *general* but *words* or *names*, which are applied to *ſeveral* things. The reaſon is, becauſe the mind obſerves thoſe ſeveral things to *agree* to that which is the reaſon or foundation of that *common* or *general* name.†

§ 7, *page* 137, *line* 7. *Ever compound them, &c.* If they have the *ſhape* of their maſter in their *eye*, the *ſound* of his voice in their *ears*, &c. one would think they can hardly avoid the having the *image* or *idea* of him in their brains, and that is a *compound idea*.

They appear not to miſs them, &c. This has ſome appearance of an argument, that they do not either perceive or remember; for perceiving or remembering without diſtinction is not perceiving or remembering at all, or at leaſt of no uſe.‡

§ 8, *page* 138. *Names* are not always the *ſigns* of *ideas*.§ The word *nothing* is the *ſign* that our mind

* Lee, p. 65. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. p. 66.
§ B. 3, c. 3, § 9. Proced. of the Und. b. 2, c. 5. King de Or. M. p. 7. Watts Log. p. 1, c. 3, § 3. Berkley concerning the Princ. of Hum. Know. Introd. p. 6, Chamb. Dict. in Abſtract, and general.

conceives a thing as not *exiſting*, or of the *negation of exiſtence*; but we have no *idea* of *nothing*, nor of that act of the mind by which we conſider a thing as not exiſting.*

Whatever may be denied of abſtract ideas, it is certain all true demonſtration is in abſtract ideas.†

§ 9, *page* 138, *line* 11. Abſtraction is certainly a different act of the mind from ſenſation, whence reflection and abſtracted ideas have their original; though perhaps ſenſation and reflection may furniſh us with all the firſt objects and occaſions whence theſe abſtracted ideas are excited and derived. Nor in this ſenſe and view of things can I think Mr. Locke himſelf would deny my repreſentation of the original of abſtract ideas, nor forbid them to ſtand for a diſtinct ſpecies.‡

The abſtract natures of things conſiſt ſolely in idea, and are not properly objects that can enter by material organs.§

§ 11, *page* 139. There is a gradation or ſcale of aſſent of the principle of action among creatures, in proportion to their perfection. Brutes and men are ſpontaneous with regard to the motions of their bodies. But men have further a power of directing arbitrarily their perceptive capacity to and throughout their paſt perceptions, which brutes have not, (and therefore cannot be called thinking creatures.)‖

And this is the ſpecific difference betwixt rational and irrational beings, as this power is the foundation of the rational nature.¶

§ 13, *page* 140, *line* 16. *Hence it comes to paſs, &c.* Hence it is plain that *ideas* are not the foundation of *certainty* or

* Lee, p. 66. † Baxt. N. p. 310. ‡ Watts Log. p. 32.
§ Watts Log. p. 91. Baxt. p. 84, p. 89, p. 134. Not. p. 86.
‖ Baxt. p. 84. ¶ Ibid. p. Not. 79, 84, 107, 156. Brown on the Underſt. p. 173.

true knowledge; for if they are, how ſhall a *ſober* man judge he himſelf is not *mad?* for mad men's and ſober men's *ideas* are equally *true ideas.**

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex IDEAS.

§ 2, *page* 144. *A Complex Idea* is made by joining two or more *ſimple ideas* together; but when ſeveral of theſe ideas of *a different kind* are joined together, which are wont to be conſidered as diſtinct ſingle beings, this is called a *compound* or *collective idea*.†

§ 4, *page* 145. The word mode is generally uſed for any property, quality, affection of a ſubſtance, by which it is either diſtinguiſhed from other ſubſtances or from itſelf.‡

A mode is that which cannot ſubſiſt in and of itſelf, but is always eſteemed as belonging to, and ſubſiſting by the help of ſome ſubſtance, which for that reaſon is called its ſubject.

It is by ſome authors applied chiefly to the relations or relative manners of being: but in logical treatiſes it is often uſed in a larger ſenſe, and extends to all attributes whatever, and includes the moſt eſſential and inward properties, as well as outward reſpects and relations, and reaches to actions themſelves, as well as to manners of action.§

* Baxt. p. 68. † Watts Log. p. 33.
‡ Watts Log. p. 69. § Ibid. p. 16.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes; and firſt, of the Simple Modes of Space.

§ 1, *page* 147, *line* 8. MODIFICATIONS *of the ſame idea.* The *modifications* of any thing are only the different *modi exiſtendi*, or manners of exiſting belonging to that thing: *that is*, when a thing exiſts in different ſtates or conditions, degrees or quantities, &c. theſe may be called different *modi exiſtendi*, or *modifications* of a thing.

§ 5, *page* 148. *Figure*, in fewer words, is nothing but the determination of *ſpace* or *body*.*

§ 12, *page* 153. The idea we have of ſpace is of extenſion in the abſtract, not of a concrete extended ſubſtance.†

The extenſion of body implies a particular action exerted, but the extenſion of ſpace implies no ſuch thing. Space has all the true marks of neceſſary extenſion, matter has all the contrary. To ſay, once ſpace was not extended implies a contradiction: it is impaſſive, without figure, location, diviſion, motion.‡

§ 16, *page* 154. This dilemma is avoidable only by owning *ſpace* to be *ſubſtance* (though not *body*,) neither *material*, nor *cogitative*.§

* Watts Log. p. 71. † Baxt. p. 350. Watts Log. p. 13, 17.
‡ Baxt. p. 351. § Lee, p. 73. Carteſ. Princ Phil. p. 2, § 20. Newt. Princ. Math. Schol. Generale ad Fin. ejuſdem Optic. Qu. 20, p. 315. Dr. Clarke Dem. Prop. 2, his Letters to Leibnitz, p. 1, 11, 41, 55, 77, 101, 125, 181, 299, &c.—Ralphſon de Spa. Reali. c. 5.—Jac. Ode. Princ. Nat. Philoſ. p. 22, 48.—Notes or Or. of Ev. Cudworth, Intell. Syſt. 644, 766.—Green's Prin. Phil. b. 1, c. 4, § 8. 18.—Bayle Dict. p. 2790, 3083.—Colliber's Enquiry into the Being and Attrib. of God.—Gretton a priori, c. 6, 7.—Watts Philoſ. Eſſ. 1, p. 21.

§ 21,

§ 21, *page* 157. The controverſy about a *vacuum* cannot be directly ended; unleſs it could be proved either, that there is no *ſpace*, but where there is ſuch a *body* in it as does produce ſome *ſenſible* effect: or that there is ſome *ſpace*, where there is no *body* that can affect our *ſenſes*; both which are equally impoſſible to be proved.*

Stretch his hand beyond his body? Yes; if there is *ſpace* which is not *body*; but this is begging the queſtion: otherwiſe, I anſwer, No; except there come ſo much *matter* from beyond the confines, as to fill that *ſpace* which the hand left.†

§ 24, *page* 159. This is the beſt argument to prove a *vacuum*, viz. becauſe we can ſo naturally conceive *ſpace* diſtinct from *body*.‡

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration, and its Simple Modes.

§ 12, *page* 167. THOUGHTS cannot be meaſured in length any more than they can be deſcribed by figures or colours; ſo that meaſuring duration by them ſeems like meaſuring pain by the inch or foot. And therefore we may have ſome notion of duration or time by our conſciouſneſs merely of the ſucceſſion of our thoughts; yet they cannot come near the being a proper ſtandard, or adequate meaſure of it.§

§ 18, *page* 169. Time is defined by Leibnitz, to be the order of ſucceſſion of created beings.‖

* Lee, p. 73. Baxt. p. 37. † Lee, p. 74.
‡ Lee, p. 75. § Ibid. p. 78.
‖ Baxt. p. 375. Not. Ult.

§ 31, *page* 178. *External objects* cannot operate upon the mind any otherwiſe than by *preſent* impreſſion, and therefore the knowledge or notion we have of *duration*, *time*, and *eternity*, is gained by the exerciſe of our *natural faculties* of imagining and reaſoning, and not by *ſenſation* only.*

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expanſion conſidered together.

§ 12, *page* 188. TO theſe two particulars, wherein ſpace and duration differ, may be added a third, viz. that ſpace is ſomething real, and diſtinct from the mind conceiving it; but duration is only a mode of the mind's conception concerning the exiſtence of itſelf, and other things.†

CHAP. XVI.

Of NUMBER.

§ 1, *page* 189. *NUMBER*, abſtracted from the thing numbered, and from the names and figures by which it is expreſſed, is nothing but a thought or mode of conception, and is improperly called an *idea*.‡

CHAP. XVII.

Of INFINITY.

§ 6, *page* 197, *line* 16. *BUT in other ideas it is not ſo.*—Theſe words ſeem to ſuppoſe that we can have an idea of the greateſt whiteneſs that can be; but this we can no more have, than

* Lee, p. 81. † Ibid. p. 84. ‡ Ibid. p. 89.

of

of the greateſt degree of extenſion that can be. We may indeed ſuppoſe a thing ſo white, that, if adding a greater degree to it, will make a different *idea* in our fancy or imagination; but this he hath alſo obſerved of the addition of ſpace and duration, when the *ideas* under conſideration are very big or ſmall.* But notwithſtanding this, we add to any degrees of *whiteneſs*, ſtill greater degrees of it, which, though leſs or equal will not, will increaſe it *in infinitum*, juſt as the increaſe is made in *extenſion*.

§ 7, *page* 198. Every idea is finite or limited, and therefore to ſay the idea of infinity is limited, is a flat contradiction; and to ſay that it is a continual growing idea, does not mend the matter. A perſon of ſixteen years old is a growing perſon, but the number is not ſo, for that will be immutably the ſame; and the attributing that to the number which is a fixed limited mode of our conception, which is proper only to the thing numbered, creates all the confuſion.†

§ 13, *page* 202. Though we have no complete and adequate idea of infinite, this does not prove that our notion or knowledge of infinity is not poſitive; for we may have a poſitive notion, or rationally grounded knowledge, of that which we do not comprehend.‡

§ 14, *page* 202, *line* 4. *He that conſiders that the end is body.*—This ſeems not a ſufficient anſwer to the argument alledged; for though the end, *i. e.* the extreme parts of any thing be as much parts, and as poſitive beings as the middle parts, yet they may alſo be conſidered, as they are in this argument, *ſc.* as the negation of further *extenſion*. But an anſwer may be fetched from the argument itſelf. For

* B. 2, c. 15, § 9, p. 148. † Lee, p. 89.
‡ Lee, p. 89.---Not. on King.---Cudw. Int. Syſt. p. 647.---Jac Ode Theol. Nat. p. 27.---Ralphſon Dem. de Deo. p. 2.

granting what was demanded in the argument, that the *end* of *ſpace* is *nulla extenſio ulterior*, an *infinite ſpace* therefore is *quod non habet nullâ ulterioré extenſionem*; now becauſe we know not how much this *aliqua ulterior extenſio* is, which, as he elſewhere expreſſes it, is a confuſed, incomprehenſible remainder, we cannot have a clear, complete *poſitive idea* of *infinite ſpace*. We have no *idea* of *infinite ſpace* for this reaſon, when I have not the *idea* of all the parts of any thing, I have no perfect *idea* of the whole thing; and ſince *infinite ſpace* is made up of infinite parts, *ſc.* ſuch parts as I can come to no end of, I have not a complete *idea* of *infinite ſpace*; for if I had, I ſhould have an *idea* of all the parts of it, and then the mind would come to an end of thoſe parts which have no end at all; *which is abſurd.*

§ 15, *page* 204, *line* 2. *This is plain negative, &c.*—What a *negative idea* is, or how part of an *idea* can be ſaid to be *negative*, is to me unintelligible. I underſtand what a *negative propoſition* is, as *a horſe is not a ſtone*; but I have no *idea* of what is *not a ſtone*. But yet I have no *poſitive* reaſon to believe that propoſition is very true. A *negative idea* therefore is very obſcure, unlimited, or rather no *idea* at all.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the other Simple Modes.

Page 209. *Of other ſimple modes.*—It is not evident from the deſcription here given, whether they be thoſe he calls *ſimple modes*, or thoſe he calls *mixed*; but they ſeem to be ſuch *ſimple modes* as are variations of the ſame *ſimple idea.*

* Lee, p. 100.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

§ 1, *page* 212. *Of the Modes of thinking.*—The author now uſes the word *mode* again in its uſual ſenſe, not that new one he hath made for it.

What this author calls the *modes of thinking* are only the ſeveral *operations* of the mind according to the *variety* of the objects, or the *manner* of its being employed about them.*

It is as abſurd that the bare repreſentation of things ſhould be under the choice and conduct of the underſtanding, as it is that we ſhould ſee what we pleaſe only when we look out of our window to the neighbouring fields. The ſoul reaſons full as conſiſtently as an unexperienced ſtranger would do about new and unknown objects.†

§ 4, *page* 214, *line* 11. *The mind fixes itſelf*—It were to be wiſhed that Mr. Locke had applied this to the poſſibility of matter's thinking.‡

§ 4, *page* 214. This is ſpecious at firſt view, but is indeed a very equivocal argument, and concludes different ways according to the different acceptation of the word eſſence. He grants that thinking is action, and ſuppoſes eſſence to be the internal unknown conſtitution of things whereon their diſcoverable qualities depend. Now that thinking or action, which is a known property of the ſoul, ſhould be the internal, unknown conſtitution of the ſoul is a contradiction, and, proving the contrary, is proving what was never denied. But this is not the genuine acceptation of the word eſſence. (*Vide infr. p.* 44, § 6.) From whence we

* Lee, p. 22. † Baxt. p. 261. ‡ Ibid. p. 192.

may ſee the fallacy of Mr. Locke's argument. He makes eſſence the internal, unknown conſtitution of things; and becauſe it is contradictory, that thought ſhould be of the eſſence of the ſoul in this ſenſe, he infers it is not of the eſſence of the ſoul in the other ſenſe, i. e. ſo as to be inſeparable from it; but that thought is eſſential to the ſoul, in the laſt ſenſe, may be thus proved. It muſt be eſſential to one of the two ſubſtances, i. e. either to matter or ſpirit; otherwiſe the higheſt perfection in nature muſt be merely caſual, or an extraneous accident in the univerſe, but it can neither be eſſential to matter, nor accidental. (*Vide infr. p.* 140.) Ergo, it muſt be eſſential to ſpirit, or ſuch a property which cannot be ſeparated from it without deſtroying its nature. Or if thinking is eſſential neither to body or ſoul, how come we at all to think? Is it by mere accident? If ſo, it is poſſible the ſoul ſhould never think. If it be ſaid the ſoul lays down and takes up thinking at pleaſure, (by its own power, &c.) it is a direct contradiction. If the ſoul pleaſes to take up thinking after intermiſſion, it muſt be previouſly thoughtful: if it be ſaid to ſtand in need of ſome external principle to bring back thought to it, this is to own that it would never think again of itſelf, but be a dead inactive ſubſtance, unleſs reſtored by ſome external being. And the argument muſt come to this on Mr. Locke's hypotheſis, if the ſoul were for any the leaſt time without thought. The power of thinking in a ſubſtance once dead, cannot be conceived, becauſe it is contradictory. Life itſelf conſiſts in being percipient, in this we are neceſſary, and if we are percipient, we muſt have perceptions by the terms: thus it is very conceivable, that the ſoul ſhould remit its activity in thinking through all degrees, till at length it can remit no farther, and finds itſelf neceſſary in having ſome perception or other.*

* Baxt. p. 153.

Thinking

Thinking, (allowing it a variable property) may invariably belong to the ſoul: as figure is a variable property of matter, and yet invariably and inſeparably belongs to matter; and as it is only the exerciſe of power, not the power itſelf, that is ſubject to the variation of being intended or remitted. This does not make the power itſelf ſeparable from the ſoul. Again, Mr. Locke himſelf grants that *thinking* is the condition of being awake (*Sup. p.* 72,) a property then capable of being intended or remitted, neceſſarily belongs to the ſoul, at leaſt for that time, and if we were always awake, would always and neceſſarily belong to it. And ſince we cannot ceaſe being awake at pleaſure, it is not in our power to become unactive at pleaſure, or we are neceſſarily active. It is the indiſpoſition of the body which occaſions our not being always awake, that hinders our not always exerciſing the power of activity, allowing the ſoul ſometime inactive.*

§ 4, *page* 214, *line* 17. *And laſt of all, &c.*—But this is only *experience* of having no memory of conſciouſneſs then, which does not infer that we had no conſciouſneſs then. When an evidence makes oath that his memory does not ſerve him ſo far, how much proves he by this? Nothing ſurely on either ſide. He only owns that the point in controverſy might have been ſo, or otherwiſe, for any thing he can remember.†

Line 30. *Thinking is the action, &c.*—This opinion is not ſafe, nor the reaſon well-grounded. For when the mind ceaſes *thinking*, ſo far as we can conceive, it ceaſes to be any thing at all; and ſuppoſe the *eſſence* of any ſubſtance be taken for the *combination* of all the properties and qualities by which that thing is *diſtinguiſhed* from another, then I cannot ſee, but that the *ſelf-activity* of the *ſoul*, which includes both *thinking* and *motion* too, and which diſtinguiſhes it from *body*

* Baxt. p. 148. † Ibid. p. 71.

 and

and *ſpace*, may not be capable of *degrees*, of being increaſed or diminiſhed according to the various ſtates and circumſtances in which it ſhall be, for the exerciſe of that and other *natural* powers.*

CHAP. XX.

Of Modes of Pleaſure and Pain.

§ 2, *page* 216. THESE definitions of *good* and *evil* are not *complete*: 1. Becauſe they ſeem to confound *cauſe* and *effect*, for we call *effects good* as well as *cauſes*. 2. They do not keep up the juſt diſtinction between *moral* and *phyſical* good and evil: for if all be called deſervedly *good* that procures *pleaſure*, then there is no diſtinction between *real* and *apparent* good. There are ſome actions *good* or *evil* by an *immutable* conſtitution of the wiſe Author of Nature, and do not depend upon the *variable* opinions of men to make them *otherwiſe*, whatever they may call them.†

Pleaſure and pain appear to be mere ſenſations, rather than proper ideas.‡

CHAP. XXI.

Of POWER.

§ 1, *page* 220, *line* 17. THAT *idea* we call *power*. —*Power* no way differs from that we call a *cauſe*, but that *power* relates to an *effect before*, and cauſe to an effect *after* it is actually produced. But neither power, cauſe, or effect, are *ideas*, purely the *names* we give thoſe modes of conceptions which are formed in our minds, upon our obſervation of the mutual *relation* of ſubſtances, and their *operations* upon another §

* Lee, p. 94. † Ibid. p. 95. ‡ Watts Eſſ. 52, p. 81. § Lee, p. 95.

§ 8, *page* 224. *Liberty* is not a *power* to do or forbear any action, &c. nor indeed is it any *power* at all. It is only the defect, the abſence or ſuſpenſion at leaſt of a *power* in any agent *diſtinct* from that which has the *power* of preferring or chooſing; and ſo it only ſignifies the *extent or mode* of the mind's power we call the *will*, and not a *diſtinct* power itſelf from the *will*.*

The power of *willing* and *underſtanding* is proper ſenſe, but the power of liberty or freedom is nonſenſe. What any one means therefore by liberty of will, is no more than this, that no agent, neither God, nor angels, nor any natural cauſe whatever, does irreſiſtibly impel, or mechanically force his will to any good action, or reſtrain it from any evil; but that the only reaſon of his preferring a good action to an evil one is from himſelf.†

§ 8, *page* 224, *line* 13. Liberty conſiſts not only in acting according to moral motives where they are; but in ſelf-determination by the power of the will, where circumſtances are indifferent; and that in the Deity himſelf.‡

§ 8, *page* 224, *line* 13. *So that the idea of liberty.*—This is nothing elſe but *a power* to execute the *determinations of the will*, and an exemption from external force for that purpoſe. So that this *liberty* doth not at all reſpect the *determinations of the will*, but ſuppoſes them to be over before it comes into play. But the general and moſt common notions of *liberty* concern the very *determinations of the will*, and the laſt reſult of our reaſon and judgement; and in the firſt it is required, whether the mind be *determined* to will by any *external* cauſes, and if it be, it is certainly not *free*. 2dly, Whether it be *determined* to will by the reſult of its own reaſon and judgement, ſo that it muſt neceſſarily will accord-

* Baxt. p. 97. † Ibid. p. 98. ‡ Ibid. p 367.

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* Baxt. p. 97. † Ibid. p. 98. ‡ Ibid. p 367.

ing to ſuch reſult, and if it be ſo *determined*, ſome think it is *not* free, others that *it is*.*

§ 8, *page* 224. Mr. Locke takes a great deal of pains to prove that ſuch liberty does not belong to the will; which is very certain, granting his ſenſe of liberty to be the only one, ſince by his definition it is evidently ſubſequent to the choice or preſence of mind, and only relates to the execution of ſuch choice by an inferior faculty. But then, beſide this idea of liberty, which is nothing to the preſent queſtion, there is another previous and equally proper one, which regards the very determination, preference, or direction of the mind itſelf, and may be called its power of determining to do or forbear any particular action, or of preferring one to the other; and if freedom can with any propriety of ſpeech be attributed to one of theſe powers, as he has conſtantly attributed it, why may it not, with equal propriety, be attributed to the other?†

§ 11, *page* 226. In all theſe caſes, as the acts are not *voluntary*, are not *volitions*, ſo nobody pretends to *liberty* in them. But where there is *thought* or *volition*, there is *freedom* or *liberty*, and in no other caſe. *Freedom of mind* therefore is not its *power* to do or forbear according to its *volition* or preference, but *liberty* from the *impulſe* and *reſtraint* of other cauſes diſtinct from itſelf. That is the true meaſure of freedom, where that *power* in other *agents* operates upon it, there it is a *neceſſary* agent, but where that power is wanting or ſuſpended, there and there only it is *free* ‡

§ 23, *page* 233, *line* 15. *So that*.—If any one ſays, that when the mind either acts or forbears a thing propoſed, it has a *power* at the ſame time to do neither,

* Vide Infr. § 8. † Law on K. Notes, p. 245. ‡ Baxt. p. 100.

and

and therefore that proceeds from its own *free* determination, that it doth either of them at all; this *determination* muſt proceed from an *antecedent* will.

§ 25, *page* 234, *line* 4. *Whether a man be at liberty*.—This ſeems to be a quibble upon the word *pleaſes*, which had been avoided by ſaying *either of the two*; and the queſtion being ſo worded would have been ſo far from carrying its *abſurdity* ſo manifeſtly in it, that it would have been that great and famous one concerning the *freedom of man's will*.

But what does it ſignify to me that I muſt neceſſarily take one ſide, or the other, right or wrong, ſo long as I can chuſe either of them indifferently? If I can chuſe either of the two. Here is full room for the exerciſe of liberty, and whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr. Locke's next queſtion; inſtead of which he ſlips in this abſurd query, *Whether a man, &c.**

§ 29, *page* 236. Freedom may be juſtly predicated of the will, or of the mind in exerciſe of it; not indeed his kind of freedom, i. e. that of acting, which belongs to another faculty; but freedom, in our ſenſe of the word, i. e. a certain phyſical indifference, or indeterminateneſs in its own exerciſe, which is what moſt men underſtand by lib. arbitrium. For if there be ſuch a liberty in human nature, we have then got an abſolutely ſelf-moving principle, which does not want any thing out of itſelf to determine it, which has no phyſical connection with, and of no conſequence no occaſion for that grand determiner *anxiety, &c.*

To affirm that the mind or will is determined by the preſent ſatisfaction, uneaſineſs, &c. is ſaying, that it generally has ſome motives from without, according to which it determines the above-mentioned powers; though in reality it always can, and often does the con-

* Vide Baxt. p. 90, 116, 119. Strutt's Remarks, p. 38.

juſtly be conceived to make that *determinate* our wills, which removes what is contrary to that.

§ 44, *page* 247. The reaſon of men's not governing all their actions by the view of eternal happineſs, and ſo in proportion to the true value of the good they aim at, may be as well accounted for from the want of a due conſideration of the *nature* and *certainty* of that happineſs, and the diverting, and more preſent pleaſures they meet with, as from the ſenſe of a preſent *uneaſineſs*. For as a due conſideration of the *nature* and *certainty* of that happineſs raiſes the mind to its juſt height of *deſire* and *preference*; ſo the *uneaſineſs* that comes from the means only wears off and becomes no *motive* at all to *good* men.*

§ 47, *page* 249. This act of ſuſpenſion muſt either be founded in the ſelf-moving power of the mind, and conſequently be naturally independent on all motives, reaſons, &c. and an inſtance of the mind's abſolute freedom from any external determination; which is a contradiction to Mr. Locke's general hypotheſis: or elſe it muſt be determined, by ſome motive or external cauſe, and then it will be difficult to make it free in any ſenſe.†

Page 249, *line* 12. *In this lies liberty.*—Were we in ſuch a ſtate of perfection that our *deſires* always tended to our *happineſs*, this would be a determination of *liberty*; but ſince in the condition we are we ſhould oftener deſire *wrong* than *right* (*ſenſual* pleaſures being more apt to be ſuggeſted to our minds than *rational* ones) our being able to ſuſpend the execution of our *deſires* gives room for thought and reflexion; and the more our *deſires* and *volitions* are the reſult of them, the more *free* we are; for thoſe *actions* are moſt *free*, which

* Lee, p. 105. † Law on K. p. 264, vide § 52.

are from a lively ſenſe, and forcible conviction of the *goodneſs* of what we do, though we could not do otherwiſe, than thoſe we have a cold indifference to.

§ 48, *page* 250, *line* 1. *This is ſo far from being a reſtraint.*—§ 50, *page* 251, *line* 30. *Such determinations abridge not.*—The author (as appears from the inſtances he preſently gives) underſtands by *freedom*, an exemption from the force of external cauſes, which might hinder the execution of our *determination*, if we did determine; not an exemption from the force of our determination, when we make any; for according to theſe we muſt act when we do act. Now though it will not be granted him, that he hath ſecured the *freedom* of our minds, becauſe his reſtraining the word *freedom* to the ſenſe he uſes it in will not be allowed, ſome underſtanding by it an indifferency after the utmoſt determinations of the mind; yet it is as eaſy to ſhew that a neceſſary compliance with theſe determinations is no *abridgement of freedom*; for ſince the freedom of an action conſiſts in that lively ſenſe and conviction of the goodneſs of it, and that ardor, and impetus, and tendency of the mind to it, with which it is performed; and ſince we always act with this diſpoſition of mind when we act upon the *reſult* of our reaſons and judgements; though we be neceſſitated always to act according to this *reſult*, we are nevertheleſs *free* in our actions; becauſe they would ſtill be performed with that diſpoſition of mind in which *freedom* conſiſted; whereas, on the contrary, if we were perfectly indifferent after the utmoſt determinations of our minds, if the ſenſe and conviction of the goodneſs of an action, the conſequent ardour and tendency of the mind to it, did not always carry us to act, it is evident the external cauſe ſometimes muſt do it; and we ſhould be liable to be determined by them, which is a ſlavery and ſubjection to ſuch cauſes. So that we ſee that a *neceſſary* compliance with the dictates of our *mind* is not only

conſiſtent with *freedom*, but is the main *preſervative* and *ſecurity* of it.

§ 48, *page* 250. Upon the ſuppoſition of our being inviolably determined in willing by our judgement, it would be really impoſſible for us to will amiſs or immorally, let our judgements be ever ſo erroneous. The cauſes of which, (§ 64, *page* 262, *line* 4) *proceed from the weak and narrow conſtitution of our minds*, and are moſt of them out of our power; either therefore we can will without and againſt a preſent judgement, and therefore are not neceſſarily (i. e. phyſically) determined by it, or we cannot be guilty of a wrong volition, whatever proves the one by neceſſary conſequence eſtabliſhes the other. Farther, there are innumerable indifferent actions which occur daily, both with reſpect to abſolute chooſing and refuſing, or to chooſing among things abſolutely equal, equal both in themſelves and to the mind, on which we evidently paſs no manner of judgement, and conſequently cannot be ſaid to follow its determination in them.*

§ 52, *page* 253, *line* 15. *Whatever neceſſity, &c.*—If this force which draws us towards happineſs in general, be abſolute and irreſiſtible, as his words import, it will draw us equally towards all particular appearances of it, and conſequently prove as bad a ground for ſuſpenſion as for liberty. But in truth this ſuſpenſion is neither founded in any neceſſity of purſuing happineſs in general, nor in itſelf an original power of the mind diſtinct from that of volition, but only one particular exerciſe or modification of it.

§ 58, *page* 258, *line* 7. *A man never chuſes amiſs.*—This expreſſion is of the ſame nature with thoſe that follow: ſc. *we ſhould undoubtedly never err in the choice*

* Law on K. p. 251.

of

of good, we ſhould infallibly prefer the beſt.—The reaſon of them is this, becauſe he ſuppoſes that when all *future* conſequences of our actions were removed, thoſe that had the moſt *preſent* happineſs, would be really the beſt for us, would be for our *true good.*

Ibid. He knows what beſt pleaſes.—He would always chuſe the greateſt *preſent* good, if no *future* conſequences attended his choice.

Ibid, line 8. *Things in their preſent enjoyment—The apparent and real good—The preſent good and evil*—Theſe expreſſions are all of the ſame nature, and import this much: That theſe things which are concluded with the *preſent* enjoyment, and have no *future* conſequences, are truly and really ſo *good* as they ſeem to be; ſc. as they are at *preſent*, and no better: they have juſt ſo much good as they bring along with them, and no more: whereas others, upon account of their future conſequences, may be either better or worſe, may really have either more or leſs *goodneſs* than they *ſeem* to have, ſc. than they bring along with them at *preſent*. Such, therefore, in the main, all circumſtances taken in, may be different from what they ſeem, may have more or leſs *true* and *real* good, if their conſequences be conſidered, than is *apparently preſent*.

Ibid. line 16. *Were the pains of honeſt induſtry.*—There is ſo great difference betwixt theſe two *pains*, that we ſhould certainly chuſe the former; as alſo betwixt the two *pleaſures* mentioned, that we ſhould certainly chuſe the latter. Theſe inſtances therefore are brought to prove the aſſertion above, *that we ſhould chuſe* the greateſt *preſent* good, if no *future* conſequences attended the choice.*

§ 59, *page* 259, *line* 7. *Our deſires look beyond—and carry the mind—according to the neceſſity.*—Sc. never but

* Vide Mor. Phil. p. 195.

when we think that abſent good neceſſary to our happineſs, and that is not often.

§ 63, *page* 262, *line* 49. *For that lies not in comparing.*—For here it is ſuppoſed there is none to compare.

Ibid. line 51. *But in another ſort of wrong judgement, which is.*—Concerning things conſidered, as they may prove *good* or *evil* to us hereafter: this ſort of *wrong judgement* is deſcribed § 66, *page* 264, and it differs in this from the former, that, in that, *preſent and future pleaſure or pain* were conſidered ſimply in themſelves, *abſtracted* from the things which procured them; but this begins with the *things* themſelves, and conſiders whether they will procure any *future good* or *evil*, and how much.

§ 68, *page* 265, *line* 18. *And very often in the means to it.*—When we have hit upon ſome means that we like, we take up with them, and think not any other neceſſary, though perhaps they are.

Ibid. line 27. *That they do not eaſily.*—If theſe be meant of the miſtake of the means, the ſenſe is, that we more eaſily take up with the means we have lighted upon, when others ſeem unpleaſant. For this will conduce to make us think them unneceſſary; if they be underſtood of the miſtake of the end, the meaning is, that we can hardly think that any part of our happineſs which cannot be obtained but by making us unhappy.*

§ 69, *page* 266. It is objected by Leibnitz, That if the mind could create pleaſure by an arbitrary determination and bare election, it might, for the ſame reaſon produce happineſs in infinitum. But it is ſurely no good conſequence to infer, that becauſe I can will a thing abſolutely and freely, therefore I can will it in

* Vide Law on K. p. 333.

infinitum? May I not as juſtly be ſaid to underſtand a thing in infinitum, becauſe I perceive or underſtand it at all?*

§ 71, *page* 270, *line* 38. *I wiſh they, &c.*—It is antecedent to and independent on any particular thought or judgement, and continues equally independent after them. It remains in the ſame ſtate after the determination of the judgement, as that Mr. Locke ſuppoſes of the operative powers of the determination of the will.†

This indifference of the operative powers is what can never conſtitute morality, ſince their operations are no farther moral than as they are conſequent upon, and under the direction of the will.

There muſt then be another indifference prior to them, in order to make the exertion of them free in any tolerable ſenſe.‡

§ 73, *page* 273. To theſe might be added poſition or diſtance, for it is manifeſt, that as the ſame body is in different poſtures and diſtances, it may produce differing perceptions, as of colours, magnitude, figure, &c.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

§ 2, *page* 275, *line* 29. *SEVERAL of thoſe complex ideas.*—Some actions, for inſtance, enjoined by law muſt have been in the lawgiver's mind before they actually exiſted amongſt men, becauſe they were performed purſuant to the law, and in obedience to it.

§ 5, *page* 277, *line* 7. *He ſhall find the reaſon of it to be*—&c. it was done for the ſame reaſon and end that

* Law on K. Note, p. 50. † Ibid. p. 49. ‡ Vide Sup.

language was inſtituted for. This collection of ideas and language had both the ſame end and reaſon.

§ 10, *page* 280. Some men think *number* has been as much *modified*, or at leaſt as capable of being ſo, and having diſtinct names too as *motion* or *thinking*. But as for *power* they never ſaw any *modifications* of that but only of the ſeveral *qualities* or *properties* which give that name to ſubſtances.*

§ 11, *page* 281, *line* 22. *And therefore* many words. —He ſeems to ſuppoſe that creation and freezing are actions of a different kind from either thinking or motion, and conſequently as we have no idea of. But why may not creation be conceived to be a thought in the divine mind, and volition of God, upon which the exiſtence of things is neceſſarily conſequent? As for freezing, it is only the ſtopping or diminiſhing the agitation of the parts of water, which is a *modification* of motion.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas *of Subſtances.*

§ 2, *page* 283. THE name of *ſubſtance* we give to any thing whoſe exiſtence we conceive *independent* upon every thing elſe, and in which ſeveral properties or qualities are united or combined. And the *nature* and *eſſence* of every particular thing can be that only by which it is *diſtinguiſhed* from every thing elſe; the *nature* or *eſſence* of every *ſubſtance* as diſtinguiſhable from every *quality* is, that its manner of *exiſtence* is *independent*, and that it has ſeveral qualities *united* in it; and the *nature* and *eſſence* of every *quality*, as diſtinguiſhable from every *ſubſtance*, is, that its *manner*

* Lee, p. 109.

of

of exiſtence is dependent, and that it has no *qualities* united in it. And in this ſenſe we have as clear a notion of *ſubſtance* in *general*, or of any *particular ſubſtance*, as we have of *quality in general*, or any *particular* quality. And therefore it is not fair, firſt to require us to abſtract every *property* and *quality* which conſtitutes the *eſſence* or *nature* of it, and then aſk us, *What it is?* there being no ſuch *ſubſtance* in the whole world.*

§ 5, *page* 290, *line* 14. *The one being ſuppoſed—and the other* ſuppoſed—whatever therefore *be the ſecret.*— The author by theſe expreſſions declares, that there is ſomething to be conſidered in things beſides the *collections* and *combinations* of their *qualities*, ſomething that is the *cauſe* of their conſtant union and perpetual *co-exiſtence*, which is the *ſubſtratum* and *ſupport* of them, which notwithſtanding is utterly unknown to us, and might give occaſion to the old philoſophers to ſay the *eſſences* of things were unknown; and this indeed ſeems neceſſary to be allowed; for otherwiſe, of *created ſubſtances*, for inſtance, it muſt be affirmed that *God* created only ſo many *collections* of *qualities*, which would be harſh and abſurd to ſay.

That we have as good proof of its exiſtence as we have for that of matter, I grant, but to ſay our ideas of their modes and properties are equally clear and diſtinct, appears to be a very groundleſs aſſertion.†

§ 9, *page* 295. *Primary* properties do not conſtitute *complex ideas*, becauſe they are rarely known, for though we can by our ſenſes diſcover, indeed, that in the general there are ſuch *qualities* as *motion*, *figure*, &c. yet they go not towards making up the *ideas* of particular *bodies*, where we do not perceive them.‡

* Lee, p. 111.
† Brown's Anſwer to Chriſtianity not Myſterious, p. 35
‡ Lee, p. 112.

§ 17, 18. *page* 301. He has before aſcribed motivity, or a power of putting body into motion by thought, to ſpirit, as one of the *ideas* peculiar to it; ſo that by mobility he ſeems to mean a capacity in ſpirit of being moved by ſomething ab extra, and not the power of moving, which is included in motivity, eſpecially ſince he makes mobility common to both matter and ſpirit, which, with ſubmiſſion, I think is wrong, and tends to confound the ſubſtances he would diſtinguiſh.—A ſubſtance that no way impedes motion, but effects it, can with no propriety, I think, have the capacity of mobility aſcribed to it, as it is to body, a ſubſtance which reſiſts motion, and no way effects it, and therefore wants an external mover. To make ſpirit material, and ſo at once both to cauſe and hinder motion, is a plain contradiction. Spirit, it is true, ſtops motion, but it is by the ſame living efficacy, by which it begins it; not by a deadneſs or reſiſtance in itſelf to be moved. Beſides, a ſpirit when it moves, hath no moment as body hath, proceeding from its vis inertiæ. It cannot be ſaid to reſiſt, being brought from motion to reſt, or v. v. ſince it effects theſe changes. If it moved circularly, it could have no centrifugal force. When a man walks his ſpirit moves his body, but is not moved by it. If both were moved, there would be no mover. Nay, in the journey betwixt London and Oxford, where the man's ſpirit is not the mover, but the horſes move the coach, his body and all, his ſpirit does not impede the motion, or make the draught heavier, or is not properly amoved. So that in effect, mobility doth not belong in common both to body and ſpirit. Nor, farther, can motion belong to both, but in very different ſenſes.

§ 19, *page* 301, *line* 3. *For having, &c.*—It is true ſpirits change place, and motion, in this ſenſe, is competent to all finite ſpirits. But in this motion they are not moved but movers; which is the diſtinction endeavoured to be confounded. Sceptical people conclude from

from this, that whatever moves is material; but it will not follow that whatever moves as a mover is material, and has the relation of matter. For in the idea of the motion of body, a moved, and not a mover, is implied; and the affections of movement, reſiſtance, and tendency to move in the ſame uniform direction, are neceſſarily included. Were there but one body in the univerſe, theſe affections would inſeparably attend its motion: and yet then the relation of diſtance would never ſhew motion. The diſtinction of ubi and loco, which Mr. Locke obſerves § 21, *page* 302, to be of little uſe to our conception, was introduced probably to ſignify that body and ſpirit occupy ſpace after a different manner, though we cannot conceive that difference of manner.*

§ 23, *page* 303, *line* 6. *If he ſays, he knows not what he thinks.*—The author ſeems to confound *cohæſion* of parts with *extenſion*, which are very different *ideas*, and may be diſtinct and ſeparate in the mind; for we may conceive the parts of matter *unam extra aliam*, one being not in the place where the other is, without any *idea* of *cohæſion*, i. e. mutually touching one another at preſent, but indifferent as to their continuing ſo, or being ſeparated; we may have therefore a clear *idea* of the *extenſion* of the parts of matter without any *idea* of their *cohæſion*, much more without conſidering the *cauſe* of their *cohæſion*. (The beſt modern philoſophers affirm it to be done by the conſtant *action* of ſome immaterial being, and moſt probably of *God* himſelf, who being every where is the moſt able to effect in this in every part of the univerſe) which is indeed an inſupportable difficulty, but comes not in very properly or very pertinently in this place. The truth of this matter is, that there ſeems not to be any *difficulty* or obſcurity at all in either of the *ideas* of *extenſion* and *thinking*, and it is very improper to inquire into the *manner* or *modes* of them,

* Baxt. p. 48.

this, I ſay, cannot be proved, becauſe there will always be wanting an idea by which we muſt prove, or explain that relation.*

§ 8, *page* 66. 2. All the *habitual knowledge* we can have of any of the properties of ſubſtances except they be viſible, muſt be gained by rational inferences, that ſuch and ſuch cauſes will produce ſuch and ſuch effects, or ſuch effects argue ſuch cauſes, which are maxims, when applied to particulars.†

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

§ 1, *page* 69. *INTUITIVE knowledge* is not *real* but upon ſuppoſition of the truth of the ſenſes; nor any propoſition true or falſe but upon ſuppoſition of things without us, and that our *ſenſes are true*; which I am confident cannot be proved by way of *ideas*; for the *ideas* are only the ſigns of the things, as words are the ſigns of *ideas*; but neither *ideas* or *words* are ſigns of any thing, if the *things* themſelves be not ſuppoſed, and conſequently no *propoſition* can truly be formed about them.‡

§ 2, *page* 70. If *demonſtrative knowledge* be of any uſe, we muſt preſuppoſe the truth of the ſenſes as well in this as in *intuitive knowledge*.§

For in each ſtep of the *demonſtration* there muſt be an *intuitive knowledge*, or rather a *ſenſitive knowledge*, a perception by the ſenſes: otherwiſe the mind could not with any certainty judge of the connexion between the ſeveral objects in the progreſſion of its thoughts.‖

* Lee, p. 238. † Ibid. p. 289. ‡ Ibid. p. 240.
§ Lee, p. 241. ‖ Ibid. p. 242.

§ 11,

§ 11, *page* 74, *line* 2. *And not quantity.*—Theſe words refer only to the word *counted*, and not to *made*, and the meaning is this: we do not reckon two whiteneſſes to be different becauſe we know the preciſe number of corpuſcles which produce each of them, but becauſe our ſenſes perceive each of them to be *diſtinct ideas*, which ſince our ſenſes cannot do in the moſt minute degrees and differences in *whiteneſs*, therefore this is not a thing capable of demonſtration.

§ 14, *page* 76. *Senſitive knowledge* is really the foundation both of *intuitive* and *demonſtrative*.*

Ibid. page 77, *line* 8. *This certainty is as great.*—This is a very obſcure expreſſion; the meaning of which ſeems to be this; when I remove my body near to ſomething, which I fancy ſends *light* to me at ſome diſtance, though I am not certain perhaps that there is any thing *really exiſting* which enlightened me at a diſtance, and to which I approached; yet I am *certain*, that in all ſuch caſes, I ſhall feel *pleaſure* or *pain*. There is ſo much *certainty* as will aſſure me of *happineſs* or *miſery*. The *certainty* I have therefore in all ſuch circumſtances may be ſaid to be commenſurate, or proportionate to, or as great as my *happineſs* or *miſery*; and this is as much *certainty* as we need look after.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

§ 6, *page* 79. IT is an utter impoſſibility that matter can ever become by any power a living, ſelf-moving ſubſtance; ſeeing, matter muſt reſiſt all change of its preſent ſtate, as it is a ſolid ſubſtance.†

Page 80, *note, line* 10. The *whether* ſhould not be whether God *can*, but whether he *has* made matter capable

* Lee, p. 244. † Vide Baxt. p. 10, 27, 29.

of thinking; ſc. whether *the actions or operations of which we are conſcious, and for which we have the common name of thinking, can be performed by mere matter*, and then it will be eaſy to diſcover by all the *phænomena* in nature, that *matter* can no more *think* than a triangle can have four angles. For let matter have what figure, bulk, motion, or poſition, by parts that can be imagined, it can no more perceive or be conſcious of its own actions or motions than a ſtone can riſe from the ground of its own accord, or without the impulſe of another body. Whether Omnipotency can add to matter a faculty of thinking, we do not care for diſputing, becauſe we have no notion of it abſtracted from infinite wiſdom; and therefore are content to ſay, that according to the preſent ſtate of the world, and of the experience of our faculties, that if matter ſhould think, it would as much ceaſe to be matter, as a triangle would ceaſe to be a triangle that had four angles.*

Ibid. It is no leſs than a contradiction, &c. —But there is nothing diſcoverable from the *idea of God* or *matter* that can make it a contradiction for *God* to be *material*, but what will as fully demonſtrate that it is a contradiction for the ſouls of men to be only *modified matter*; not from the *idea of God*, becauſe the complex idea of God is made up only of ſimple ideas which we find in ourſelves magnified in *infinitum*; not from the *idea* of *matter*, for we have none that is general, or which extends to all the individual ſyſtems of it in the univerſe. Ergo, &c.†

The whole argument that matter cannot think nor move itſelf, concludes in much fewer words from conſidering the endleſs diviſibility of it.‡

Diviſibility is ſuch an affection of ſubſtance as ſhews on the one hand that matter becauſe diviſible cannot think or be a living ſubſtance; and on the other, that ſpiritual ſubſtance, becauſe thinking cannot be diviſible or have parts.*

Page 83. A man may warrantably ſay, that to effect a contradiction is not the object of any power; nothing leſs limits Omnipotence: and ſuch it is to effect that a ſubſtance, which as ſolidly extended muſt reſiſt all change of ſtate, ſhould, while remaining ſolidity extended become of *dull dead earth*, life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion. (Vide infr. p. 145) So that notwithſtanding of this complaint, as if the Biſhop had been unreaſonable in oppoſing his concluſion, it appears the reaſon was good, and that he could not go one ſtep farther without deſtroying the eſſence of matter, viz. ſolid extenſion; and that he had already gone a ſtep or two too far, in making the *ſpontaneous mover* in an elephant, and the external mover in the mechaniſm, both of plants and animals, properties of dull and dead earth.†

But it is perfectly abſurd to ſay that infinite power may ſuperadd a property to a ſubſtance incapable of receiving it. The ſubſtance of being firſt diviſible, and then the parts of it remaining dead, the property can have no ſubject of inheſion but the junction of dead parts to dead parts. But that the junction of dead particles, or coheſion of them, itſelf a property, ſhould be the ſubject of another property, is an abſurdity Mr. Locke himſelf hath ſufficiently expoſed.‡

If this *ſubſtance* or ſubſtratum be ſo *unknown* a thing, as Mr. Locke ſuppoſes, how can I deny any thing concerning it? Or at leaſt how can I be ſure that God and the material world have not one common ſubſtance? Mr. Locke indeed endeavours to guard his principles or doctrines from this objection: but I think he neither does, nor perhaps could he effectually ſecure them ſuch unhappy conſequences.§

* Vide Bayle Dict. p. 1924, under Leucippus Not. on King. p. 38. Rel. of Nat. p. 186. Dr. Clark to Lodwell. Ditton's Append. to Reſurr. Law on King. p. 134.
† Lee, p. 249. ‡ Baxt. N. p. 85.

* Baxt. p. 106. † Ibid. p. 86.
‡ Baxt. p. 165. § Watts, p. 63.

§ 8, *page* 330. Inferences grounded on ſuch ſuppoſitions as theſe of the cat and parrot, are mere romance.*

§ 9, *page* 333, *line* 20. *And as far as this* conſciouſneſs.—The meaning of this, and ſome following expreſſions of this nature, is not *that perſonal identity* that reaches no further than the *memory* of our paſt actions: for we may have perfectly forgot ſome of them, which yet certainly were the *actions* of our *very ſelves*. That which is here aſſerted therefore is, that ſuppoſing any paſt *actions* return to our minds, either by the power of *remembrance*, or external ſuggeſtion, if we have the ſame *conſciouſneſs* of them that we had of them at *firſt*, and which we have of *preſent* actions, we are the *ſame* perſons that did them, and not otherwiſe.

§ 10, *page* 333. Conſciouſneſs is only the repeated and ſucceſſive acts of the mind, by which it takes notice of its former and ſucceſſive actions; but actions cannot unite themſelves, and therefore that which muſt make theſe diſtinct and ſucceſſive acts of conſciouſneſs to be the actions of one being, muſt be ſomething diſtinct from the actions themſelves, and that muſt and can be only the mind itſelf. Ergo, it is that and not conſciouſneſs that denominates the perſon the ſame with himſelf at different times.†

Page 334, *line* 27. *Different ſubſtances.*—The author's method ſeems not to be good here; for in this place he takes that for granted, which a little lower in theſe words, "*Or can be continued in a ſucceſſion*," he ſpeaks doubtfully of, and § 12, *page* 335, debates as a queſtion.

Ibid. line 29. *As different* bodies, by the ſame life.—Sc. *Different particles* of matter falling as faſt as they come, into the diſpoſition, or organization that ſome

* Lee, p. 124. † Ibid. p. 125.

one original maſs had, are ſtill eſteemed the *ſame* vegetable or animal body.

Ibid. line 36. *For* as far as any intelligent being.—He ſeems to ſuppoſe there may be an intelligent being (meaning, I believe, his perſon) ſubſiſting of itſelf, independent of all thinking ſubſtances, which one after another may be joined to it; a ſtrange thought.*

Ibid. line 48. *The ſame* conſciouſneſs uniting.—He ſuppoſes two ſubſtances, one which hath the ſame conſciouſneſs of the other's paſt actions that it hath of its own preſent ones, to be the ſame perſon.

§ 11, *page* 335, *line* 7. *Are a part* of ourſelves, &c.—and ſubſtance whereof perſonal ſelf conſiſted.—The author ſeems to have forgot his definitions of perſon § 9, *page* 333, *a thinking intelligent being*, of which certainly matter cannot be a part, and indeed this is not at all a fit inſtance, nor does it come up to the matter in hand, though he uſes it ſeveral times afterwards.

The limb, whilſt it is vitally united to the body, was no more a part of our *conſcious* ſelves, than our blood is. No part, nor indeed the whole body, is any more than the ſoul's inſtruments in its operations, does not think, is not conſcious of any of its actions. The eye does not ſee, nor the ear hear, &c.—This then ſeems rather an argument to prove, that *animus cujuſq. eſt is quiſq.* becauſe the man is the ſame after the limb is cut off, then the contrary.†

§ 12, *page* 335, *line* 1. *And to this* I anſwer.—This paragraph ſeems very obſcure, and confuſed, and little or nothing to the purpoſe.

Ibid. line 6. *It is plain.*—They ſeem to make it the ſame with *animal identity*.

Ibid. line 10. *Before* they can come to deal with theſe men.—For theſe men making *animal* and *perſonal*

* Vide § 25. † Lee, p. 128.

identity the *ſame*, will demand firſt of all, as previous and preparatory to all further diſputes, why thoſe that allow *animal identity* to be preſerved in the *change* of *ſubſtances*, will not grant that *perſonal identity* may alſo be ſo preſerved: and this the other ſide muſt reſolve before they enter into any further debates, unleſs they will deny *animal identity* to be preſerved in the change of material *ſubſtances*; ſc. unleſs they will, it is one immaterial ſpirit in brutes, that makes in them the ſame life.

§ 12, *page* 335. To the two parts of this queſtion may be given theſe two plain anſwers: to the firſt, that if the *thinking ſubſtance*, the principle of intellectual operations, be changed, it cannot be the ſame perſon. To the ſecond, that if it be not changed, it is the ſame perſon.

Ibid. page 335. *A purely material, animal conſtitution.*—If the fleeting animal ſpirits be the *ſoul*, the intelligent being, there will be as many perſons as there are diſtinct animal ſpirits, or particles of *refined* matter; for they never make each other conſcious of their ſeveral motions and actions.

Ibid. page 335. *As well as animal identity.*—But not ſo much as animal identity is preſerved in the change of material ſubſtances, except that change be gradual, and inſenſibly ſucceſſive in the courſe of nature.*

§ 13, *page* 336. *That cannot be reſolved, &c.*—The two conditions here propoſed, are ſomewhat unreaſonable: for 1ſt, I preſume nobody knows what kind of ſubſtances thoſe are which *think*; becauſe, if *thinking* of all ſort be abſtracted, there remains nothing in an intelligent being which we can conceive, and becauſe there is no ſuch ſort of ſubſtance in the world. 2dly, If *conſciouſneſs* be only a power, or *repeated* acts of *knowing*, I aſk, whether it can be conceived without a *ſubſtance* or ſomething, call it ſoul or body, wherein that power

* Lee, p. 125.

is,

is, or of which that *conſciouſneſs* is the ſucceſſive and repeated *action?* 2. Whether men can be *conſcious* of that which they never did, or judge they did that of which they never thought of doing? And 3, Whether *thought* can be imagined without a *ſubſtance*, any more than *motion* or *figure* without a body *moving* or *figured?* And if it be ſo, which ſeems to be the ſenſe of all the world, then *conſciouſneſs* neither can conſtitute the *perſon*, nor can be *transferred* from one ſoul to another, any more than one man's pain in his head or foot can be *transferred* to another's.*

Ibid. line 16. *Will be hard.*—To make this ſenſe run clear theſe words muſt be read together: *till we know what kind of action it is, and how performed in thinking ſubſtances*; and the intermediate ones left out.

Ibid. page 16. *What kind* of action.—Sc. What kind of action this repreſentation of things to our mind as done by us, which never were really done, is.

Ibid. page 17. *That* cannot be done, &c.—This ſentence, and that which follows, *Who cannot, &c.* are put in to ſhew that if there be ſuch a repreſentation of things to our minds, as is mentioned above, there muſt be alſo a *conſciouſneſs* of them.

Ibid. line 20. *The ſame conſciouſneſs.*—Sc. not being meant of the individual *conſciouſneſs*, for that no one ſubſtance can have at different times, but a *conſciouſneſs* of the ſame ſort or kind.

Ibid. line 26. *As well as ſeveral repreſentations in dreams.*—It is true, a man may be deceived at preſent in a dream, but I never heard that any man ever dreamed, that he did that which at the ſame time he thought another perſon did, or that he thought, i. e. was *conſcious* of that which he did not think he did, and ſo he was not deceived in the conſciouſneſs of the reflex act.

* Lee, p. 126.

Ibid. line 35. *How far this.*—He intimates that if thinking be placed in ſuch a ſyſtem, the *conſciouſneſs* of paſt actions may be transferred from one *thinking* ſubſtance to another. (For *animal and perſonal identity* being then the *ſame*, preſerved in a change of *material* ſubſtance, if any one perſon be the *ſame* with himſelf at different times, different ſubſtances muſt be *conſcious* of the *ſame* actions as done by themſelves.) And he leaves it to be conſidered therefore how far the *goodneſs of God* may be an *argument* againſt ſuch an *hypotheſis* of *thinking*.

§ 14, *page* 337, *line* 2. *Whether* the ſame.—Whether the ſame *immaterial being* which alone is *conſcious* of the actions of its paſt duration, may be wholly ſtript of all ſuch *conſciouſneſs*.

Ibid. line 18. *Not having continued.*—Or inactivity, but having been conſcious of ſomething or other in every one of thoſe ages.

Ibid. But till he have ſome of that *conſciouſneſs*, which it is impoſſible to have, it is as impoſſible for one ſoul to be in ſeveral bodies in different ages, as for two perſons, who co-exiſt, to feel each other's pains or pleaſures.*

§ 15, *page* 338. But if there was not the ſame *ſoul*, the ſame principle of intellectual operations, though poſſibly there might be a new *creation*, there could be no reſurrection. It is better therefore to content ourſelves with the aſſurance of a *reſurrection*, from reaſon and revelation, than pleaſe ourſelves with an *imaginary* and *miraculous* creation.†

§ 18, *page* 340, *line* 16. *Or could own.*—Nor could the finger own any of the actions of the body after the

* Lee, p. 128. † Ibid. p. 129.

ſeparation;

ſeparation; for he now ſuppoſes it to act after the ſeparation, becauſe it has life.

Ibid. There is no manner of doubt, but that every diſtinct ſoul ſhall in the future ſtate be made conſcious of its good or ill actions, but the grand queſtion is, Whether this be poſſible, if the ſoul was annihilated? It is an idle thing to hope for that which almighty wiſdom has given us no ſort of evidence, that it is ſo much as poſſible, any more than he has, that all the ſoul, all its ſenſations, and other operations, can be epitomized in a finger.*

§ 21, *page* 342, *line* 2. *Cannot* be the ſame man.—Yes; by the *ſame* ſoul being united to *thoſe* particles of matter, which compoſed his body, when he died, put again into the ſame organization or *animal life* at the reſurrection: and though ſome *new* particles ſhould be taken in alſo to complete the work, yet ſo long as the old ones were the rudiments, and foundations of it, this would not deſtroy *animal identity* according to his own principles.

§ 25, *page* 344, *line* 40. *Any ſubſtance* vitally united.—Sc. any ſubſtance whatever in any nature.—But this is a ſtrange expreſſion, which ſeems to imply that when any one ſpirit is no longer a *man's ſelf*, by being ſtript of its *conſciouſneſs*, there ſtill remains a *preſent thinking being*, to which a *new ſpirit may be vitally united.* And indeed the author has been forced to uſe ſome harſh and uncouth ways of ſpeaking, by reaſon of the ſtrangeneſs of his notion, in which he ſeems after all to be miſtaken; for it is much more agreeable to reaſon that *thinking ſubſtance and perſon* ſhould be *one* and the *ſame* thing. It is an extravagant fancy to imagine that *one ſpirit* ſhould become *conſcious* of the actions of *another*, as if they were its own, and ſo they *two* be *one*

* Lee, p. 128.

perſon. Nor is the other ſuppoſal much better, that any *one* ſpirit by loſing the *conſciouſneſs* of all his *paſt* actions, and getting the *conſciouſneſs* of *new* ones, ſhould thereby become *two* perſons. It would not indeed be concerned, as he ſays, in thoſe actions which he had loſt all *conſciouſneſs* of; he would not attribute them to *himſelf*, or think them his *own*; but he would ſtill be the *perſon*, that did them. What the author aſſerts, that *ſuch a ſpirit would not be accountable*; *ſc.* rewardable or puniſhable for ſuch actions ſeems juſtly queſtionable; he himſelf hath given an inſtance to the contrary among men. And though perhaps it may ſeem moſt probable and agreeable to the divine juſtice and wiſdom, that ſhould men be *conſcious* of what they are rewarded or puniſhed for by him; yet this is by no means certain, at leaſt, as to all *particular* good and bad actions. And I ſuppoſe our author himſelf would ſcruple to allow that an *intellectual ſubſtance*, which according to his own ſuppoſition § 13, *page* 336, had got a *conſciouſneſs* of all other actions, ſhould be *rewardable* or *puniſhable* for them.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Other RELATIONS.

§ 10, *page* 372. *VIRTUE* and *vice* are not mere *arbitrary* names, but reſolvable into *immutable* relations, i. e. are as *immutable* as the ſureſt maxims of *truth* and *falſehood*.*

§ 11, *page* 373. Nothing more is intended by theſe expreſſions, but that virtue was ſo agreeable to the natural ſenſe of mankind that they reckoned praiſe the general reward of it, not *virtue* itſelf. Cic. Tuſc. l. 4. *Virtus eſt affectio animi conſtans convenienſque laudabiles efficiens eos in quibus eſt, ſeparata etiam utilitate laudabiles.*

* Lee, p. 133.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Clear and Obſcure, Diſtinct and Confuſed Ideas.

§ 2, *page* 383, *line* 11. *OUR ſimple ideas are clear.*—He means that then they are *clear*, when they are ſuch that nature deſigned we ſhould have.

Ibid. line 23. *And* the number and order.—For if there are complex ideas, which are continually varying as to their number, and order of their ingredients, they can never be *clear* in the ſenſe above-mentioned.

§ 4, *page* 384, *line* 1. *As a clear idea is that.*—The perception the mind hath of *clear ideas* is all it can, or is to have, and is a vigorous, lively perception.

§ 5, *page* 384, *line* 9. *No idea therefore.*—Every *idea* conſidered in itſelf as in the mind is diſtinguiſhable from all others (different perceptions making it ſo) and is only a *confuſed idea* of the things the names it is expreſſed by ſtand for. Thus the *idea* of a ſpotted beaſt conſidered in itſelf is diſtinct from that of a beaſt without ſpots, and from all other *ideas* in the mind, and is only a *confuſed idea* of thoſe beaſts expreſſed by the names *leopard*, *lynx*, *panther*.

§ 8, *page* 386, *line* 12. *This draught.*—Theſe ſurprizing pieces of art are ſaid to have been invented, or much improved by one Mr. *Matthews*, Fellow of *Sidney* College, *Cambridge*.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantaſtical Ideas.

§ 4, *page* 395. BUT moſt men think they could have no notions of any *moral virtues or vices* without deriving them from *real* actions either in their own minds, or from the ſenſible actions of others; and as every man's notions agree, more or leſs, with that which is founded in nature, ſo they are more or leſs perfect, but not more or leſs *real*. And no ideas ſeem to be *archetypes* or *originals*: they are all, when in the mind, types or copies derived from *real* actions in nature; elſe *virtue and vice* would be arbitrary notions, made according to every man's pleaſure and fancy.*

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

§ 2, *page* 397, *line* 1. SIMPLE *ideas* are *inadequate* as well as *complex*: 1. Becauſe there is no *natural* connexion between thoſe *qualities*, when conſidered in the *object*, and the *effect* of them, when conſidered as in the *mind*; the *effect* is widely different and *incommenſurate* by the cauſe. 2. Becauſe we have more knowledge of all the ſorts of *ſingle qualities or modes* of *particular ſubſtances*, than we could derive from the things conſidered in themſelves: ſo vaſtly do the effects exceed their *original ſimple cauſes*.

§ 6, *page* 400. The word *eſſence* is generally uſed for that only by which a thing is *diſtinguiſhed* from every thing elſe, and in this ſenſe we may have as *adequate idea* of any *ſubſtance* as of any *quality* in it.†

* Lee, p. 136. † Ibid. p. 138.

Ibid.

Ibid. line 3. *Now thoſe ideas.*—In order to underſtand the author's ſenſe of this matter we muſt recollect from what has gone before, what *ideas* we have of *ſubſtances*, and how far they anſwer their *archetypes*.

1. Therefore to begin with the general diviſion of *ſubſtance, of matter and ſpirit*, which are all the ſorts of it we know of. The *idea* we have in general of matter is an *idea* of *ſolidity, extenſion, figure, &c.* with an *unknown ſubſtratum*, ſupport, or cauſe of union of theſe qualities. The *idea* we have of *ſpirit* in general is an *idea* of conſciouſneſs or *thinking* in general with an *unknown ſubſtratum* or ſupport alſo. This *ſubſtratum or cauſe of union* is the ſame thing which the men he here hath to do with, call *real eſſence, ſpecific eſſence*, or *internal conſtitution, &c.* from which all the qualities flow, upon which they depend, and with which they have a neceſſary connexion.

2. The *idea* we have of particular material ſubſtances, ſc. inanimate, vegetable, animal bodies, conſiſts, 1ſt, Of all that was in the former idea, becauſe they are ſo many parcels of matter. 2dly, Of the ſuppoſition of a diviſion into minute parts, and of a particular bulk, figure, and motion of thoſe parts, which are called the *primary qualities* of bodies; which, though they muſt needs be ſuppoſed, or elſe all parcels of matter would be alike, are as unknown to us as the *ſubſtratum* above. 3dly, Of active and paſſive powers diſcoverable by our ſenſes, which are called ſecondary qualities, becauſe they reſult from the primary ones, and are indeed all that we think, have ideas of, or conceive in them. So likewiſe our *idea* of particular *immaterial* ſubſtances, ſc. *God, angels, human ſouls*, conſiſts of the *idea* abovementioned, and the ſuppoſition of any particular *modes* of *thinking* unknown to us, and the active and paſſive *powers* we know in them.

Of any of theſe particular *material* ſubſtances (for of theſe alone the author treats) ſc. *gold*, it may be ſaid, that its *primary qualities* (ſc. the particular *bulk, figure, motion,*

motion, &c. of its parts) are its *real eſſence*; they are that which diſtinguiſh it from all other matter in the world, and from whence all its active and paſſive *powers*, diſcoverable by our ſenſes, flow.

From hence it is evident; 1ſt, In our idea of any particular *material* ſubſtance, ſc. *gold:* the ſubſtratum of its ſolidity and extenſion, as it is matter; its *primary qualities*, or real eſſence, as it is gold: and many of its active and paſſive powers, or *ſecondary qualities* being unknown; no ſuch *idea* can be *adequate*; for ſo much as is unknown, it cannot include, repreſent, or anſwer to; ſo much it wants of perfection, and ſo much it is different from its *archetype*.

2dly, That thoſe, whoſe *idea* of gold is only referred to, ſolely reſpects, and is abſolutely terminated upon the *real eſſence* of gold, which is unknown to them; ſc. thoſe who when they think of gold, endeavour to think of nothing but the *real eſſence* of it: theſe men, I ſay, are ſo far from having an *adequate idea* of gold, that they have no manner of idea of it, nor indeed any idea at all: for ſince of that which is unknown in things we can have no idea, we can never think of any thing if we do not know it. And ſince their idea of *gold* extends to *nothing* but what is unknown; it is plain there is nothing of that which is in gold in this *idea*; there is correſpondency betwixt the type, and its pretended *archetype*, no likeneſs, no reſemblance. It is no more the idea of gold than of any other thing; and indeed it is the *idea* of nothing; ſc. no *idea*, but a deluſion of the mind, thinking it has an idea when it has none.

3dly, Thoſe whoſe *idea* of *gold* is referred to *ſenſible qualities* of it only, or its active and paſſive powers diſcoverable by us; ſc. thoſe who when they think of *gold*, think of nothing but theſe: ſuch men, I ſay, though they have ſomething of that which is in gold in their idea, yet are far from having an adequate idea of it, for the reaſons abovementioned.

Ibid.

Ibid. line 4. 1. *Sometimes* they are.—Sometimes when men think of ſubſtances they endeavour to think of nothing but a ſuppoſed real eſſence in them.

Ibid. Sometimes they are.—§ 8, *page* 403, Thoſe who endeavour to copy ſubſtances.—Sometimes ſome men, when they think of ſubſtances, think of nothing but that collection of that active and paſſive powers they obſerve in them, and this is all the idea we have of them.

Ibid. line 12. *It is uſual.*—He ſuppoſes that men generally give names to things only upon account of their ſpecific eſſence; that their names ſolely reſpect them; ſo that they would not, for inſtance, call a parcel of matter, gold, did they not think it had a certain real eſſence, which runs through all the parcels of that ſort; for its having ſuch an eſſence is what they mean when they give it that name.

Ibid. line 24. And thus they.—Thus they give the name of gold, under which they rank all parcels of matter of that ſort. They give it, I ſay, to thoſe parcels only upon account of a *ſpecific real eſſence*, which they are ſuppoſed to have, and to be diſtinguiſhed by from all other parcels of matter.

Ibid. line 41. For then the properties.—He ſuppoſes the *complex idea* already made by a collection of thoſe qualities we have hitherto diſcovered in a *ſubſtance*, and that afterwards we find ſome others, which might as well be put into the collection, but that they were found out too late: ſc. after the *collection* was made.

Ibid. line 59. *That men* ſhould.—That they ſhould aſcribe the diſtribution of things into ſorts to the ſpecific eſſences (one of which is ſuppoſed to run through every ſort and diſtinguiſh it from all others) as the only cauſe of ſuch a diſtribution.

§ 9, *page* 404, *line* 2. *Could not rationally*—For the real eſſence being but one, a fixed and certain thing:

whatever qualities depend upon that, muſt be fixed, certain, and immutable: ſo that every parcel of matter we call *gold*, muſt have the ſame bulk and figure, which we ſee is not ſo.

§ 12, *page* 405, *line* 15. *That ſimple idea.*—Thus when I have the idea of paper being white, I think of a power it hath to produce that ſenſation in me: and the paper hath really juſt ſuch a power extending only to its effect, and no other: for if it extended to other effects alſo, it might produce a ſenſe of other colours as well as whiteneſs; which I ſee it doth not; ſo that my idea correſponds, anſwers, is agreeable, adequate, and commenſurate, to the power in the paper of which it is the *idea*.

§ 13, *page* 406, *line* 25. *A man has no idea.*—He means of unknown ſubſtratum, of extenſion and ſolidity in matter.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and False Ideas.

§ 6, *page* 409, *line* 1. THESE ſuppoſitions.—Chiefly of *abſtract complex ideas*; and the reaſon is, that men being very much given to make theſe *abſtract ideas*; it is natural for them to ſuppoſe they are agreeable to things without them, for elſe they muſt think they had not made them right.

§ 9, *page* 410, *line* 8. *And every day's.*—Sc. by the frequent occaſions he has to obſerve what names men give to each colour.

Ibid. line 13. *By the objects.*—In which he hath obſerved how men call them.

Ibid. line 15. *Or applies the name.*—Sc. judges that that *idea* he expreſſes by the name *red*, is the ſame *idea* which

which others expreſs by that name, when it is not ſo, but is that which they expreſs by the name *green*.

§ 12, *page* 411, *line* 14. In reference.—In reference to the ideas of other men, expreſſed by the ſame names, and looked upon as a ſtandard.

§ 14, *page* 412, *line* 10. *And thus* anſwering.—This is coincident with *adequate ideas*, c. 30, § 2, *page* 394, and ſo each ſenſation anſwering the power; and with *real ideas*, c. 31, § 2, *page* 397, and thus our *ſimple ideas* are all *real* and *true*, becauſe they *anſwer*, *&c.*

Ibid. line 13. *If the mind.*—So judges of them, it makes a falſe judgement, which is all the falſeneſs there can be in *ideas*. Though indeed this falſe notion of them ſerves the uſes of life as well as the true one.

§ 15, *page* 413, *line* 6. *If the idea of a violet.*—The ſuppoſition is that the *idea*, produced by a Violet in the mind of A, is the ſame that a Marigold produces in the mind of B, and conſequently different from that which a Violet produces in the mind of B, and ſo in like manner, the *idea* produced by a Marigold in the mind of A, is the ſame that a Violet produces in the mind of B, and conſequently different from that which a Marigold produces in the mind of B. Now though this would breed no confuſion or inconvenience as to the uſes of life, provided A called that *idea* which a Violet produced in him *blue*, as well as B, though it were different from B's *idea*; and that *idea* which the Marigold produced in him, *yellow*, as well as B, though different from B's *idea*. Yet, notwithſtanding, if A ſhould think his *idea* of *blue and yellow* were the ſame with B's *ideas* of thoſe colours; this would be a falſe judgement of his *ideas*, which is all the *falſeneſs* that can be in them.

§ 18, *page* 414, *line* 12. *When they put together.*—This and the following inſtance of falſe ideas are coincident with the fantaſtical ones, c. 30, § 2, *page* 397.

BOOK III. CHAP. I.

Of Words, or Language in General.

§ 5, *page* 428, *line* 12. *ARE all words taken, &c.*—This inference ſeems to be too general; for every man, whether there were any words or articulate ſounds uſed or not, would underſtand his own thoughts; the uſing ſuch words, therefore, to expreſs inſenſible things, argues only the defect in language, but not our want of knowledge of ſuch things, unleſs we could ſuppoſe ſuch as are deaf and dumb have no thoughts or conſciouſneſs of the actions of their own minds; or that there is a natural connexion between the ſounds and the thoughts themſelves, both which are demonſtrably falſe.*

Ibid. line 13. *Spirit in its primary.*—Theſe words indeed ſeem to prove that *ſenſible ideas* were the firſt in the mind; for men would not have taken from them words to expreſs their *ideas* of *immaterial ſubſtances*, had they not been known and familiar to the mind before ſuch *ideas* of *immaterial ſubſtances*. But as for the metaphorical words he mentions, *adhere*, *conceive*, *inſtill*, they ſeem not to have been made by the firſt beginners of languages, but to have been brought in afterwards by *poets*, *orators*, *rhetoricians*, to pleaſe and gratify the fancies of men, and adorn and embelliſh diſcourſe.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

§ 2, *page* 431, *line* 13. *NOR can* any one apply.—He may pronounce the word like a parrot without knowing what *idea* it ſtands for:

* Ch. 2, § 1.

for: but if he do apply it to any *idea* at all, it muſt be to one of his own *ideas*.

Ibid. line 15. *For this would be to make.*—This would be to be capable of doing a thing which would wholly deſtroy the uſe of language, and conſequently be a reflection on the Author of nature for contriving it in ſuch a manner.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

§ 9, *page* 439. AN *abſtract idea* is nothing elſe but the repreſentation or reſemblance in the mind of a ſingle or particular viſible object, when the object itſelf is not *preſent* does not actually affect the eye.

There can be no *general* or *abſtract ideas* in the author's ſenſe, becauſe no men can think of more than *one* thing at *one* inſtant, and therefore cannot form a *general* or *abſtract idea*.*

§ 12, *page* 442, *line* 15. *Whereby it is evident.*—The ſeries and force of this reaſoning is this: *to be of any ſpecies* is the *ſame* as to have a *right* to the *name* of *that ſpecies*. To have *right* to the *name* of a *ſpecies* is to have a *conformity* to the *abſtract idea* of that *ſpecies*; to have a *conformity* to the abſtract *idea* of that *ſpecies* is to take all in that the *abſtract idea* contains; *ergo*, to have the *eſſence* of a *ſpecies* is the ſame as to have all that the *abſtract idea* of that ſpecies contains and no more; ſo that the *eſſence* of a *ſpecies*, and the *abſtract idea* of it, are the ſame.

§ 12, *page* 444, *line* 4. For *the having the eſſence.*—Having the *eſſence* of a *ſpecies*—being of that *ſpecies*

* Lee, p. 204.

—having a *right* to the *name* of that *ſpecies*—having a *conformity* to the *abſtract idea* to which that name is annexed: *ergo*, having the *eſſence* of a *ſpecies*—having a *conformity* to the *abſtract idea*.

Ibid. line 4. *That the eſſences of the ſorts.*—In order to underſtand this expreſſion, we may obſerve, 1ſt, that as the word *idea* often ſignifies in this author a *real quality* of a thing without us, as well as our thoughts and notion of that *quality*; ſo the term *abſtract idea* may ſignify a collection of *real qualities* co-exiſting in a thing without us and common to it with other things, as well as our complete thought or notion of thoſe *qualities*.

2dly, That *eſſence* and *ſort* or *ſpecies* in this expreſſion may be referred either to our minds, or to things without us; if they are referred to our minds, the meaning of the expreſſion is, that it is the *eſſence* or nature of a *ſort* to be the *workmanſhip of our underſtanding*, to be a *thought* of our *minds*, which we might have, though nothing now exiſted without us. And in this ſenſe it would more proper to ſay, that a *ſort* is an *abſtract idea*; for it is the very ſame thing with it. If they are referred to things without us (as when it is ſaid, the *eſſence of a ſort of things is an abſtract idea*) the meaning of the expreſſion is, that the common eſſence and nature of all thoſe things (i. e. all that we know, conceive, or think of them) which has occaſioned us to ſort them together is only a collection of *real, ſecondary, ſenſible qualities*, co-exiſting in them all, and in no other things: in this ſenſe it would be more proper to ſay, that the *eſſence* of all things *ſorted* is an *abſtract* idea, or a collection of *real, &c. qualities*.

The ſimple thoughts of theſe ſingle *qualities* make up our complex thought of the whole collection, to which thought we give a *name*, which mediately or ſecondarily ſignifies the collection of *qualities* alſo; and hence the collection is called the *nominal eſſence* of thoſe things (becauſe it is that *eſſence*, which the *name* ſtands for in oppoſition to the *real eſſence*, or internal conſtitution of them, which we have no knowledge or thought of, and conſequently can make no *name* for.

Ibid. page 446, *line* 28. *Now ſince nothing.*—This reaſoning ſeems not valid, for it may be ſaid, that to have a *conformity*, *&c.* and to have the *eſſence*, *&c.* are ſtill different things, though both are required to the being of a *man*. It might perhaps be made valid thus—ſince *nothing can be a man* but only by having a *conformity*, *&c.* and nothing can be a man but what has the *eſſence*, *&c.* Sc. ſince both theſe things, hitherto appearing *different* are the only way for any thing to be a *man*, they muſt needs be *one* and the *ſame* thing. It might have been ſufficient to prove this point to have ſhewn, that theſe *abſtract ideas* are *all* that we think of particular things, all the conceptions we have of them when we make them into *ſorts*.

§ 13, *page* 447, *line* 7. The ſorting of them.—Though nature has made them thus *alike*, they could not have been *ſorted*, or had *general names* given, but for the mind of man.

Ibid. page 448, *line* 40. *He will never be able.*—He means, I preſume, becauſe theſe *ſuppoſed real eſſences* are unknown, ſo that we cannot tell in any of them, for inſtance, when there is *all* of it, and when not.

§ 14, *page* 448, *line* 12. *It having been more.*—This inſtance proves that theſe contending parties have *different ideas* of a *man*. For whereas a certain ſhape of the body is a leading quality in this *idea*, one of theſe parties it is plain admits of a greater latitude in that ſhape than another.

Ibid. It is both obſcure and confounding to ſay that *abſtract ideas* are the very *eſſence* of thoſe things which are ſorted; for this does not keep up the *difference* between the act of the mind and its object; for the *idea* ſurely is in the *mind*, and the properties which make

the *eſſence* are in the *objects*, and would be there whether we conceived them or not.*

§ 15, *page* 449. Eſſence is the very nature of any being, whether it be actually exiſting or no.†

Ibid. Here (not to mention that it is not extraordinary for the ſignification of a derivative word, eſpecially in a philoſophical *ſenſe*, (acceptation) to differ widely from the grammatical meaning according to the form it is derived in) the word Being, I think is equivocal, and ſignifies the internal unknown conſtitution of things, leſs properly, at leaſt leſt commonly, than any other thing. But granting that eſſence, being, and the internal unknown conſtitution of ſubſtances are properly the ſame thing: ſince this internal unknown conſtitution once exiſted not, and yet was known then in the divine intellect, it muſt have been in idea there; ſo that at laſt in any acceptation of the word we muſt reſolve the eſſence of things into idea, and make it the ſame with their nature.‡

Ibid. If eſſence and exiſtence have different meanings (as in propriety it ſeems they ſhould) by eſſence I think can only be meant, the abſtract natures of things, or the ideas of the things in the divine intellect, which were before the things exiſted.§

Mr. Locke rather takes eſſence for the being of any thing; though we uſually ſay, ſuch a property is of the nature or eſſence of a thing, taking either word indifferently; but never that it is of the being of it, which rather imports its exiſtence,

It would have ſeemed ſtrange if Dr. Clarke had called his moſt excellent book, a demonſtration of the eſſence or internal unknown conſtitution (inſtead of the being and attributes) of God. And then if ſubſtances

* Lee, p. 205. † Ibid. p. 23. ‡ Baxt. N. p. 144.
§ Baxt, p. 143.

have

have unknown eſſences and other things have not, it will follow that there are two different ſpecies of eſſences, or that other things beſides ſubſtances have no eſſence at all. It was this put Mr. Locke upon the diſtinction of real and nominal eſſences; and aſſerting that all our moral and mathematical ideas, as of virtue, vice, &c. a cube, a ſquare, &c. (things of as fixed and immutable natures, as any that can be named) having only according to his diſtinction nominal eſſences, are nothing but the mere arbitrary compoſitions of ideas in our minds; which admitted, would be of the greateſt diſſervice both in philoſophy and practice.*

Some men pretend to have Mr. Locke's authority for inſinuating that the unknown conſtitution of things is in itſelf nothing, and that ſubſtance or what he calls ſubſtratum, is but empty ſound. But they are miſtaken, for Mr. Locke allows that the internal, &c. is *ſomething*, upon which their diſcoverable qualities are owned to depend; and this other thing, if we ſpeak of it at all, muſt be called ſubject, ſupport, ſubſtance, or ſome ſuch name; and though we have no particular idea of it, yet we know that it is, unleſs properties could ſubſiſt by themſelves, and if there be neither property nor ſubject, there would be nothing leſt to exiſt.†

§ 17, *page* 450, *line* 19. The frequent production. —See § 14. The force of this argument I take to be this, it is impoſſible there ſhould be a ſet, determinate number of theſe *eſſences*, becauſe theſe productions are daily inſtances of *new eſſences*, which appears from hence, that they have not the properties of *the old eſſences*.

§ 19, *page* 452. There is but one being which includes exiſtence in the very eſſence of it, and i. e. God. But the actual exiſtence of every creature is very diſ-

* Baxt. p. 147. † Ibid. p. 144.

tinct

tinct from its eſſence, for it *may be* or *may not be*, as God pleaſe.*

§ 19, *page* 452, *line* 43. And is founded on the.—This ſeems not to be true, becauſe the *idea* might ſubſiſt in men's minds, though they never expreſt it by any *ſign*.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

§ 6, *page* 455. THIS definition is the definition of a word, not a thing, that is a ſubſtance or a mode of it. Definition is uſually reckoned the name of a propoſition, in which the property or properties of a thing is ſo ſet forth as to diſtinguiſh it from every thing elſe; or in ſhewing the eſſence of that thing, or the genus and differentia, which is much the ſame.

§ 7, *page* 455. Single qualities are undefinable, 1ſt, Becauſe definition is an explanation; but ſingle qualities cannot be explained, becauſe they are ſenſible, and muſt be known by the help of proper organs, and when they are ſo known, no words can make them plainer. 2dly, Becauſe the reaſon or cauſe of them cannot be known at all.

§ 8, *page* 455, *line* 1. *The not obſerving*.—Theſe inſtances ſeem not pertinent; for the philoſophers, eſpecially the *Carteſians*, in defining the words *motion and light*, did not intend to raiſe or produce in men's minds the *ideas* thoſe terms ſtand for, but only to ſhew the effects of the one and cauſe of the other: ſc. what follows in matter from its having the affection called

* Watts Log. p. 11.

motion,

motion, or its being in that ſtate in the preſent ſyſtem of things; and what ſort of particles they are that raiſe that *idea* in our minds we call *light*.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of Mixed Modes and Relations.

§ 2, *page* 463, *line* 5. WHEREIN they differ.—The author ſeems to confound making of *complex ideas* with *abſtracting* them; for the *abſtracting* of *complex ideas* is as much the work of the underſtanding, as the *abſtracting* of *ſimple* ones, though *making* is not.

§ 3, *page* 463. *Mixed modes* are no more creatures of the underſtanding than ſubſtances; for a man can as eaſily diſtinguiſh between *virtue and vice*, as he can between ſome animals, plants, &c. by the light of nature, and ſuch rules as God has given every man by which to compare actions: and if *abſtract ideas* be only the ſigns of *real actions*, the actions applied to particular caſes, appear as manifeſtly different as the ſubſtances themſelves. And as barbarous as ſome men are pleaſed to repreſent others, yet moſt ſort of actions that are eſteemed good or bad, are ſo diſtinguiſhed (however different their names for them are) all the world over; and therefore are not voluntary or arbitrary.*

§ 8, *page* 467, *line* 19. *And the verſura* (a ſort of brokening) *of the Romans*, &c.—This does not prove that the *ideas* of the actions were *voluntary* and *arbitrary*, for let the *Romans* or *Jews* have agreed upon any other words to ſignify thoſe actions, yet the actions would have been the ſame: nor can I learn, how the names

* Lee, p. 210.

of theſe mixed actions tye the actions together, more than the names of ſubſtance s do their properties.*

§ 9, *page* 468, *line* 20. Who makes the.—See c. 3, § 14.

§ 12, *page* 470. I always thought it as impoſſible for a man to form any notion of *juſtice and gratitude* without comparing his own, or the ſenſible *actions* of others with the *laws of nature*, which incline him to the practice of them, as of a horſe and iron, without *ſeeing* them, or having them repreſented to him by ſomewhat like them. For it ſeems plain to me, that theſe which he calls *mixed modes*, are nothing elſe but *mixed actions*, with their circumſtances, and that we have no *idea* at all of them in our minds upon hearing or reading their *general names*, till they are reſolved into particular *actions*, and their *modes* which conſtitute them.†

§ 15, *page* 472, *line* 9. Unleſs a man will.—He intimates that if we endeavour to frame the *complex ideas* before we learn the *names*, we ſhall be apt to make ſuch *new* and *ſtrange* compoſitions, as will be utterly unknown to others, and uſeleſs to us in our converſation with them.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Subſtances.

§ 1, *page* 474, *line* 21. THAT might be a ſun.—Sc. one man may have one *abſtract idea* of a globe of fire, and another have another, different from the former, which could not be if the *abſtract idea* of a globe of fire (in which all globes of

* Lee, p. 210. † Ibid. p. 211.

fire are comprehended (were an *idea* of the *real* nature of it, for that being but *one*, there could then be but one *abſtract idea*.

§ 2, *page* 474, *line* 7. *This though it be all.*—He now ſpeaks of the loweſt *nominal eſſence* that can be made in the *predicamental* ſcale, which contains indeed all that we know of *ſubſtances* ranked under it. As the *nominal eſſence* expreſſed by the word *gold*, contains all that we know of particular pieces of *gold*, ranked under it. But higheſt in the predicamental ſcale, the *nominal eſſence* expreſſed by the word *tree*, for inſtance, doth not contain all that we know of an oak, aſh, elm, &c. ranked under it.

§ 4, *page* 475. Every thing that is *eſſential*, is eſſential to individuals, for *eſſential* is only the title or name we give to thoſe *properties and qualities*, which diſtinguiſh *individuals* from all other *individuals* that want them; and *properties* are not in *generals*, but in *individuals*.*

And the meaſure and boundary of each ſpecies will not be the abſtract ideas, but the properties of each individual, which would be in them whether we conceived them or not.†

Ibid. line 15. *Other creatures.*—The ſhape of my body may be loſt by an accident, but may alſo be made to belong to a parcel of matter united to a ſpirit very *different* from mine, and from any human ſoul; which is ſtill ſome further proof, that it is not *eſſential* to my body; the ſame may be ſaid of the reaſon of my mind.

Ibid. line 19. *None of theſe are eſſential, &c.*—Though diſeaſe or accident may take away man's life, yet it cannot annihilate his ſoul, the thinking ſubſtance, nor deſtroy thoſe thoughts, by which he is *diſtinguiſhable* from all bodies, and all other *individual ſpirits*; and

* Lee, p. 213. † Ibid.

thoſe properties ſo retained we call the *eſſence of the individual ſpirit*. None of theſe alterations are made merely by our thoughts; the mind has no more to do therein but to obſerve the properties in each individual, as made by nature, and give the ſubſtances wherein they are common or different names.*

§ 5, *page* 476, *line* 1. *Thus if the idea.*—Sc. If I take a thing in my hand, and ſay this is a *body*, then *extenſion* alone, or *extenſion* and *ſolidity both* (according as my *abſtract idea of body* is) is *eſſential* to it, ſc. while I ſuppoſe it to be a *body* and no longer.

Ibid. line 9. *Should there be found.*—A parcel of matter conſidered as ſuch can never want any thing *eſſential* to it; it is what the *Creator* deſigned it, perfect in its kind. But if any ſort of *matter*, iron, be propoſed as a *ſtandard*, it may be void of ſomething *eſſential* to its being of that *ſort*.

Ibid. page 447, *line* 4. *Or could it be demanded.*—There could be no room for this queſtion till ſome ſort of *matter*, iron, be propoſed as a *ſtandard* and meaſure of *eſſential* and *ſpecific*, from which it might *eſſentially* and *ſpecifically* differ.

Ibid. line 9. *For I would.*—Vide c. 3, § 13. He will never be able to know.

Ibid. line 13. *All ſuch patterns.*—Sc. had we not made an *abſtract complex idea* (conſiſting of a particular ſet of qualities co-exiſting united) as a *pattern* and *ſtandard* to which all parcels of *matter* were to be reduced that had that particular ſet of qualities. Were it not, I ſay, for this *abſtract idea*, all the qualities of this parcel of matter, I cut my pen with, would be one as *eſſential* to it as another. But this *abſtract idea* being made, whenever I ſuppoſed the parcel of matter, I mentioned, to be agreeable to it, its *quality* of obeying the loadſtone is *eſſential* to it: ſc. it is more *eſſential* to

* Lee, p. 215.

its

its being *iron*, than to its *malleableneſs*, though not to its being a parcel of *matter*, or metal.

Ibid. line 16. *And every thing.*—Sc. one thing as much as another, though in reality nothing at all.

This one general ſentiment ſeems to run through this excellent performance, viz. *that the eſſences of things are utterly unknown to us, and therefore all our pretences to diſtinguiſh the eſſences of things can reach no farther than mere nominal eſſences, &c.* Now that we may do juſtice to this great author, we muſt conſider that he confines this ſort of diſcourſe only to the *eſſence of ſimple ideas*, the *eſſence of ſubſtances*, as appears cap. 4, § 6, lib. 3, for he allows the *names of mixed modes always to ſignify the real eſſences of their ſpecies*, cap. 5, and that in the diſtinction of their eſſences, *there is generally leſs confuſion and uncertainty than in natural, cap.* 6, § 40, 41. Though it muſt be confeſſed he ſcarce makes any diſtinction between the *definition of the name*, and the *definition of the thing*, cap. 4; and ſometimes the current of his diſcourſe decries the knowledge of eſſences in ſuch general terms as may juſtly give occaſion to miſtake.*

We can demonſtrate ſeveral eternal truths concerning the natures or eſſences of things. For to ſhew the neceſſity or neceſſary conſiſtence of theſe eternal properties (i. e. as being originally, eternally conſiſtent ideas) is to demonſtrate eternal truths concerning their natures.†

§ 6, *page* 477. A late author hath rightly obſerved that eſſence is explained by the chief and radical property of a thing, or all the properties of it. Hence the chief and radical property of a thing is the eſſence in idea, though the thing ſhould not exiſt nor have any internal unknown conſtitution. Eſſence is very diffe-

* Vide Watts Log. p. 114. † Baxt. p. 302.

rent from exiſtence, the eſſence or nature of things is invariable, and their exiſtence only contingent.*

Ibid. line 9. *But eſſence.*—Becauſe even theſe real *eſſences* are not *eſſential* to, or inſeparable from any particular parcel of matter; for it is not *eſſential* to the parcel of matter I have now on my finger, to have that particular diſpoſition of its inſenſible parts that it has, it might as well have had, or ſtill have, another.

Ibid. line 12. *Properties belong only to ſpecies, not to individuals.*—But let a man try to ſatisfy another's hunger by his own eating, or to make another conſcious of his pleaſures or pains, and he will find that properties belong to *individual ſubſtances* or particular men, and not to the *ſpecific name*, or general word *man*.

Ibid. line 12. *Properties belonging.*—By *properties* he means *ſenſible diſcoverable qualities*, which he hath already ſhewn are no otherwiſe *eſſential* to individuals than as they are ſuppoſed to be of a *ſpecies*. And ſince theſe *properties* have an inſeparable connexion with the eſſence called the *real* they muſt ſtand and fall together. So that if *properties* are *eſſential* to things only upon the ſuppoſal of their being of a *ſpecies*, the *real eſſence* can be *eſſential* upon no other account.

Ibid. page 472, *line* 8. *But there is.*—He ſhould have ſaid here *to which any of theſe real eſſences* (from theſe qualities flow) *are ſo annexed*; for it is of the *real eſſences* he is now ſpeaking.

§ 7, *page* 478, *line* 3. *Subſtances* are.—Sc. becauſe it has that *nominal eſſence*; becauſe that *abſtract complex idea* we denote by the word, *horſe, tree, &c.* agrees to it. For this reaſon only, upon this ground alone, it is ranked under this *ſort*, and not becauſe it has ſuch or ſuch *real eſſence*, for that we know nothing of.

* Baxt. p. 152, 301.

§ 9, *page* 480, *line* 44. To try his ſkill.—A man may pretend to diſtinguiſh *ſheep or goats* by their *real eſſences* into ſeveral *ſorts*, when indeed he doth it by their *nominal eſſences*, which are known to him. But theſe animals *Caſſiowary* and *Querechinchio* (which he is ſuppoſed to ſee, and not to know how many or what *ſenſible qualities* make up the *complex idea* that denominates, and bounds the *ſpecies*) he cannot diſtinguiſh, ſo that if another *Caſſiowary* be brought ſomething different from the former, but within the bounds of the *ſpecies*, he will not be able to ſay, whether it be of that ſort, or of the ſort of *Querechinchino's*; hence it appears his pretences are vain, and that he diſtinguiſhes things into *ſorts* by their *nominal eſſences*, and not by their *real*, for if he did it by the *real*, he might as well diſtinguiſh *Caſſiowary* from *Querechinchino* as *ſheep* from *goats*, ſince he knows the *real eſſence* of the two former, as much as that of the two latter.

§ 11, *page* 481, *line* 5. *Evident from.*—The force of the argument lies in this. We cannot rank ſpirits well, and diſtinctly into different ſorts, becauſe we have ſo few ideas of reflexion that are different to make various combinations of. This ſhews that when we do rank and ſort things, we do it by ſuch combinations of *ideas*, and by the *real eſſences* of things: for they are doubtleſs as diſtinct and different, and as much unknown to us, in *ſpirits*, as in *corporeal* ſubſtances, though the *qualities* we attribute to them are not.

Ibid. page 482, *line* 54. *Who yet.*—He ſeems to ſuppoſe that all the difference between *God* and the *higheſt* order of *ſpirits*, in our *idea* of each of them, is only one degree of *exiſtence, knowledge, &c.* But is vaſtly more than ſo, being a difference between *finite* degrees, and *infinite*, which bear no proportion, if thoſe words, *infinitely more remote*, reſpect the number of *ſimple ideas*, which ſhould be put into the *idea* of *God*, more than into the *idea* of other *ſpirits*: it muſt be confeſſed that upon this ac-

count our *ideas of God* and of other *ſpirits* are very indiſtinct, for want of that vaſt number of *ideas* which ſhould enter into the *idea of God,* and which we have not put to it.

§ 13, *page* 483. *Ice* is without doubt a different *ſort* or *ſpecies* from water, becauſe it has diſtinct properties; but the man that calls it *hardened water* is no more miſtaken than if he had called *melted wax, fluid wax*; from whence I infer that giving *names* depends upon every one's experience; but not making *eſſences*; that is a work of *nature*, not of mere *thoughts or ideas.**

§ 26, *page* 490. *line* 39. *Whereby it is evident.*—It is not evident that thoſe who rejected the fœtus made only the *outward figure*, and not the *faculty of reaſoning eſſential* to a *man*; they might notwithſtanding make *reaſon* as *eſſential* as the others, who received the *fœtus*. But a certain ſhape of the body (admitting indeed of ſome variety, but within ſome certain bounds) being a leading *quality* in the *idea* of *man*; and the only indication we have that *reaſon* will be joined to ſuch a body; thoſe who reject the *fœtus* admit not ſo great a latitude in that *ſhape* as thoſe who receive it.

§ 28, *page* 492, *line* 4. *To the making.*—Theſe words till you come to *in the firſt of theſe*, ſeem put as it were in a parentheſis; and by the words any *nominal eſſence*, is meant any one, and the ſame *nominal eſſence*.

Ibid. line 5. *Firſt that the ideas.*—This is more than to ſay, that a *nominal eſſence* is a *complex idea*.

Ibid. line 8. *Exactly the ſame.*—Sc. as to ſort and kind.

Ibid. line 9. *For if two abſtract.*—Theſe words relate to the foregoing; *ſecondly, that the particular ideas ſo united*, and only to them.

* Lee, p. 217.

Ibid.

Ibid. line 11. *In the firſt of theſe.*—Theſe words refer to thoſe in the beginning of the §, *theſe nominal eſſences of ſubſtances.*

§ 38, *page* 501, *line* 16. *In the different.*—So, becauſe the collections of *ſimple ideas* expreſſed by the word *ſhock* are almoſt the ſame, denoted by the word *hound*; theſe are not diſtinct *ſpecies* of animals; whereas the collections of *ſimple ideas* denoted by the words, *ſpaniel and elephant*, are different, therefore they are different *ſorts* of animals.

§ 43, *page* 503, *line* 22. *But becauſe.*—Becauſe it is difficult by known names to lead men into the thoughts of things ſtript of thoſe *ſpecifical* differences we give them; and yet it is neceſſary that men ſhould be lead into thoſe thoughts in treating of *ſpecific ideas and names:* upon theſe accounts, it is better to uſe examples than words in this matter.

Ibid. line 24. *To make the different.*—That is to ſhew how the conſideration the mind has of *ſpecific ideas* we call *modes*, and their *names* at one time is different from what it has of them at another: as alſo the conſideration the mind has of theſe *ideas* is different from that which it has of the *ideas of ſubſtances*.

VOL. II. CHAP. VIII.

Of Abſtract and Concrete Terms.

§ 1, *page* 4. BY *concrete terms* is commonly meant the names of ſubſtances, given them either on the account of one quality or property, or their relation to one another; and by *abſtract terms* the common names of thoſe qualities, properties, or actions obſerved in ſubſtances compared with one another, in

thoſe qualities, properties, or actions, without regard to any other of properties or actions.*

§ 2, *page* 5, *line* 13. *We have very few, &c.*—The reaſon is becauſe no two or more ſubſtances can ſo eaſily be like one another in every one of their properties or qualities, as they may in ſome one *leading* quality; and therefore it is obſervable, that where an offer has been made at abſtract terms from ſubſtances, it is only to expreſs ſome *peculiar* quality, and not all the *qualities*; as in *aquoſity*, *fierineſs*, *&c.*

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

§ 2, *page* 6, *line* 1. *AS to the firſt of theſe, &c.*—This is not clear; 1, Becauſe deaf and dumb perſons, without doubt, remember their own thoughts without words. 2dly, When perſons talk to themſelves their thoughts precede their words, or excite their remembrance of their words, juſt contrary to what occurs in converſation or reading.†

§ 5, *page* 7. The doubtfulneſs of words ſeems rather to *ariſe from* the different experience of the perſons uſing, hearing, or reading theſe words, than the uncertainty of their ſignification.

The caſes in which they are generally doubtful are, 1. When words are uſed, which in the common language of the country have very different ſignifications. 2. When words are relative, and the reference is different in the mind of the ſpeaker from the hearer. 3. When words may be taken with a leſs or greater latitude, as religion, grace, faith, &c. 4. When words are uſed to ſignify actions, that agree in ſome particular circumſtances or modes with other

* Lee, p. 221. † Ibid.

actions,

actions, that do not agree with them in all, and are therefore in ſtrictneſs, to be reputed metaphorical.*

Ibid. page 8, *line* 13. *Where the ſignification.*—The author never mentions this caſe in the following diſcourſe: but he means, I ſuppoſe, that this happens in *ſubſtances* where the *names* ſignify a collection of qualities which are different from the *real eſſence* of a thing, being the effects of it.

§ 6, *page* 8. I. *Becauſe of that great compoſition.*—The multiplicity of the ideas cannot be the cauſe of the doubtfulneſs of ſuch words; but either the neglect, ignorance or prejudice of the perſon ſpeaking or hearing.†

§ 7, *page* 9. II. *Becauſe the names, &c.*—This too ſeems rather imputable to the prejudices of the ſeveral perſons ſpeaking or hearing, and not to the words themſelves, or the want of *ſtandards*: for I reckon the *ſtandards* of moral actions to be as fixed, as of ſubſtances natural or artificial; or even of *ſimple ideas*, or qualities.‡

All men, free from prejudice, can as eaſily diſtinguiſh between moral good and evil, as between white and black, from their relation to the laws of nature, and the land, which is as unalterable by the power of names, or the ideas of particular perſons, as the properties or eſſences of ſubſtances.§

Ibid. line 21. *What the word murther, &c.*—This is true, but not to the main purpoſe: for the whole queſtion is, Whether thoſe actions of which theſe words are the ſigns, be not immutably agreeable or diſagreeable to the laws of God, and conſequently good or evil; and whether thoſe laws of nature be not as certain and fixed, as the very laws of motion?‖

* Lee, p. 222. † Ibid. p. 223. ‡ Ibid.
§ Lee, p. 223. ‖ Ibid. p. 225.

§ 8, *page* 10. It is not at all material whether the word be proper or not in its original ſignification. Though the word *juſtice* be derived from *jus*, which ſignifies *broth* as well as right, yet being commonly uſed for the virtue of giving every one his due, that makes it proper.*

§ 9, *page* 10, *line* 35. *And hence we ſee, &c.*—He ſhould have diſtinguiſhed between the common or neceſſary principles, and controverſial points: for however large the commentators have been in the latter, yet in the former, which are the main, we may obſerve almoſt an univerſal conſent, allowing ſomething for the manner of expreſſion.†

§ 11, *page* 12, *line* 5. *The names of ſubſtances.*—But neither are the names of ſubſtances doubtful; becauſe they are ſuppoſed conformable to their real eſſences as made by nature; for the names of ſubſtances are given them by particular perſons, according to the properties they obſerve in them, common to other individual ſubſtances.‡

§ 23, *page* 21. *Since then the precepts, &c.*—Yet ought we as much to adore the goodneſs of God for his ſpecial providence about thoſe ancient writings, for the preſerving a laſting ſtandard for our faith and manners.§

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuſe of Words.

§ 5, *page* 24. THE author ſeems guilty of this himſelf in his uſe of the word *idea*, for he uſes it ſometimes for the act of perception, thus

* Lee, p. 225. † Ibid. p. 226. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid. p. 228.

ſenſation is an *idea*; ſometimes for the immediate objects of that perception, thus *thoughts* are *ideas*; at other times for the qualities or actions in objects, whether known or perceived by us or not; thus *figure*, *motion*, *bulk*, *&c.* are *ideas*, though not known.*

§ 6, *page* 25, *line* 22. *Logick* is the art of uſing reaſon well in our inquiries after truth, and the communication of it to others.†

§ 15, *page* 30. We have no idea either of *matter* or *body* in general, becauſe they are only the names of ſubſtances; but only of the particulars that have thoſe common names, and ſo every ſingle parcel of *matter* has as good right to the name of *body*, as every ſingle *body* has to the common name of *matter*.

§ 17, *page* 32, *line* 27. *Why might not Plato.*—The force of this reaſoning ſeems to be this: if the word *man* was thought to denote nothing but a *complex idea* of qualities diſcoverable in a certain ſpecies of things, it might as well ſtand for *Plato's* as for *Ariſtotle's*; for each of theſe is a *complex idea* of that *ſpecies* we are of. The reaſon therefore why it does not ſeem to ſtand ſo well for the one as the other is, becauſe it is ſuppoſed to denote the *real eſſence* of this *ſpecies*; and one of theſe *ideas* is thought to come nearer this *real eſſence* than another. But it may here be ſaid, that though the word *man* be ſuppoſed to denote only the moſt exact, perfect, diſtinguiſhing, *complex idea* of qualities obſervable in a ſort of things; *Ariſtotle's idea* even in this reſpect might be preferred before *Plato's*.

* Lee, p. 230. Vide c. 11, § 27. ‡ Watts Log. p. 1.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuſes.

§ 20, *page* 52, *line* 17. *FOR it is the ſhape.*—The oppoſition is not well made betwixt the *ſhape* and the *reaſoning faculty*, in reference to the *determining* of the *ſpecies*; for *reaſoning* may go as far toward that, as the *ſhape* even in the *idea* of thoſe who kill theſe monſtrous births; *ſhape* therefore in their opinion rather *indicates* than *determines* the *ſpecies*; ſc. is the only ſign we have to know when *reaſon* will be joined to the *animal* body.

The common definition of man is very faulty, animal rationale; becauſe the animal is not rational; the rationality of man ariſes from the mind to which the animal is united. 2. Becauſe if a ſpirit ſhould be united to a horſe, and make it a rational being, ſurely this would not be a man. It is evident therefore that the peculiar ſhape muſt either enter into the definition of a man to render it juſt and perfect; and for want of a full deſcription thereof all our definitions are defective.*

BOOK IV. CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

§ 2, *page* 59. *KNOWLEDGE* conſiſts in our perception of the *relation* that ſubſtances have to their own modes to us, or one another: and all *truth* is only joining or disjoining theſe ſubſtances according to ſuch relation.†

§ 7, *page* 64, *line* 2. *That of actual.*—Here we may obſerve that the author does not ſay, as in three

* Watts Log. Not. p. 109. † Lee, p. 235.

preceding

preceding caſes, that there is an *agreement* or *diſagreement* betwixt our *ideas*; for there are no two ideas or thoughts of the mind compared together, as in the former caſes, but one idea (or thought) compared as it were with ſome *real* thing exiſting without us, which produced it in our minds, and anſwers to it, as a cauſe to its effect. As therefore in three former caſes we may have intuitive knowledge of general propoſitions by a perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our *ideas* (or thoughts of our minds) which are all abſtract, and do not ſuppoſe the exiſtence of any things at all without us, now we have theſe thoughts, though they were perhaps the firſt occaſion of our getting many of them; which knowledge is the conſequence of the *ideas* which are in our minds producing there by their agreement or diſagreement, perceived *general* and certain propoſitions. So in this fourth caſe, we can only have ſenſitive knowledge of *particular* propoſitions (ſc. that ſuch and ſuch a particular thing exiſts without us) and that not only by perceiving any agreement or diſagreement of *ideas* (or thoughts in our minds) of which there is in this caſe no compariſon made, but by perceiving, ſometimes ideas or thoughts are raiſed in our minds, and affect us with pleaſure or pain, whether we will or no: which muſt be owing to things exiſting without us, and operating upon us; which *knowledge* is the conſequence of the exiſtence of things producing *ideas* in our minds, by our ſenſes; and though it is not altogether ſo certain as intuitive *knowledge*, yet it is an aſſurance that deſerves the name of *knowledge*.*

Ibid. Real exiſtence can never be proved merely by ideas, becauſe we can never have any ideas at all of ſubſtances, and conſequently not of their relation to their own properties or modes, or to other ſubſtances:

* Vide B. 4, c. 11, § 12, &c.

this, I ſay, cannot be proved, becauſe there will always be wanting an idea by which we muſt prove, or explain that relation.*

§ 8, *page* 66. 2. All the *habitual knowledge* we can have of any of the properties of ſubſtances except they be viſible, muſt be gained by rational inferences, that ſuch and ſuch cauſes will produce ſuch and ſuch effects, or ſuch effects argue ſuch cauſes, which are maxims, when applied to particulars.†

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

§ 1, *page* 69. *INTUITIVE knowledge* is not *real* but upon ſuppoſition of the truth of the ſenſes; nor any propoſition true or falſe but upon ſuppoſition of things without us, and that our *ſenſes are true*; which I am confident cannot be proved by way of *ideas*; for the *ideas* are only the ſigns of the things, as words are the ſigns of *ideas*; but neither *ideas* or *words* are ſigns of any thing, if the *things* themſelves be not ſuppoſed, and conſequently no *propoſition* can truly be formed about them.‡

§ 2, *page* 70. If *demonſtrative knowledge* be of any uſe, we muſt preſuppoſe the truth of the ſenſes as well in this as in *intuitive knowledge*.§

For in each ſtep of the *demonſtration* there muſt be an *intuitive knowledge*, or rather a *ſenſitive knowledge*, a perception by the ſenſes: otherwiſe the mind could not with any certainty judge of the connexion between the ſeveral objects in the progreſſion of its thoughts.‖

* Lee, p. 238. † Ibid. p. 289. ‡ Ibid. p. 240.
§ Lee, p. 241. ‖ Ibid. p. 242.

§ 11,

§ 11, *page* 74, *line* 2. *And not quantity.*—Theſe words refer only to the word *counted*, and not to *made*, and the meaning is this: we do not reckon two whiteneſſes to be different becauſe we know the preciſe number of corpuſcles which produce each of them, but becauſe our ſenſes perceive each of them to be *diſtinct ideas*, which ſince our ſenſes cannot do in the moſt minute degrees and differences in *whiteneſs*, therefore this is not a thing capable of demonſtration.

§ 14, *page* 76. *Senſitive knowledge* is really the foundation both of *intuitive* and *demonſtrative*.*

Ibid. page 77, *line* 8. *This certainty is as great.*—This is a very obſcure expreſſion; the meaning of which ſeems to be this; when I remove my body near to ſomething, which I fancy ſends *light* to me at ſome diſtance, though I am not certain perhaps that there is any thing *really exiſting* which enlightened me at a diſtance, and to which I approached; yet I am *certain*, that in all ſuch caſes, I ſhall feel *pleaſure* or *pain*. There is ſo much *certainty* as will aſſure me of *happineſs* or *miſery*. The *certainty* I have therefore in all ſuch circumſtances may be ſaid to be commenſurate, or proportionate to, or as great as my *happineſs* or *miſery*; and this is as much *certainty* as we need look after.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

§ 6, *page* 79. IT is an utter impoſſibility that matter can ever become by any power a living, ſelf-moving ſubſtance; ſeeing, matter muſt reſiſt all change of its preſent ſtate, as it is a ſolid ſubſtance.†

Page 80, *note, line* 10. The *whether* ſhould not be whether God *can*, but whether he *has* made matter capable

* Lee, p. 244. † Vide Baxt. p. 10, 27, 29.

of thinking; ſc. whether *the actions or operations of which we are conſcious, and for which we have the common name of thinking, can be performed by mere matter*, and then it will be eaſy to diſcover by all the *phænomena* in nature, that *matter* can no more *think* than a triangle can have four angles. For let matter have what figure, bulk, motion, or poſition, by parts that can be imagined, it can no more perceive or be conſcious of its own actions or motions than a ſtone can riſe from the ground of its own accord, or without the impulſe of another body. Whether Omnipotency can add to matter a faculty of thinking, we do not care for diſputing, becauſe we have no notion of it abſtracted from infinite wiſdom; and therefore are content to ſay, that according to the preſent ſtate of the world, and of the experience of our faculties, that if matter ſhould think, it would as much ceaſe to be matter, as a triangle would ceaſe to be a triangle that had four angles.*

Ibid. It is no leſs than a contradiction, &c. —But there is nothing diſcoverable from the *idea of God* or *matter* that can make it a contradiction for *God* to be *material*, but what will as fully demonſtrate that it is a contradiction for the ſouls of men to be only *modified matter*; not from the *idea of God*, becauſe the complex idea of God is made up only of ſimple ideas which we find in ourſelves magnified in *infinitum*; not from the *idea* of *matter*, for we have none that is general, or which extends to all the individual ſyſtems of it in the univerſe. Ergo, &c.†

The whole argument that matter cannot think nor move itſelf, concludes in much fewer words from conſidering the endleſs diviſibility of it.‡

Diviſibility is ſuch an affection of ſubſtance as ſhews on the one hand that matter becauſe diviſible cannot think or be a living ſubſtance; and on the other, that ſpiritual ſubſtance, becauſe thinking cannot be diviſible or have parts.*

Page 83. A man may warrantably ſay, that to effect a contradiction is not the object of any power; nothing leſs limits Omnipotence: and ſuch it is to effect that a ſubſtance, which as ſolidly extended muſt reſiſt all change of ſtate, ſhould, while remaining ſolidity extended become of *dull dead earth*, life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion. (Vide infr. p. 145) So that notwithſtanding of this complaint, as if the Biſhop had been unreaſonable in oppoſing his concluſion, it appears the reaſon was good, and that he could not go one ſtep farther without deſtroying the eſſence of matter, viz. ſolid extenſion; and that he had already gone a ſtep or two too far, in making the *ſpontaneous mover* in an elephant, and the external mover in the mechaniſm, both of plants and animals, properties of dull and dead earth.†

But it is perfectly abſurd to ſay that infinite power may ſuperadd a property to a ſubſtance incapable of receiving it. The ſubſtance of being firſt diviſible, and then the parts of it remaining dead, the property can have no ſubject of inheſion but the junction of dead parts to dead parts. But that the junction of dead particles, or coheſion of them, itſelf a property, ſhould be the ſubject of another property, is an abſurdity Mr. Locke himſelf hath ſufficiently expoſed.‡

If this *ſubſtance* or ſubſtratum be ſo *unknown* a thing, as Mr. Locke ſuppoſes, how can I deny any thing concerning it? Or at leaſt how can I be ſure that God and the material world have not one common ſubſtance? Mr. Locke indeed endeavours to guard his principles or doctrines from this objection: but I think he neither does, nor perhaps could he effectually ſecure them ſuch unhappy conſequences.§

* Vide Bayle Dict. p. 1924, under Leucippus Not. on King. p. 38. Rel. of Nat. p. 186. Dr. Clark to Lodwell. Ditton's Append. to Reſurr. Law on King. p. 134.
† Lee, p. 249. ‡ Baxt. N. p. 85.

* Baxt. p. 106. † Ibid. p. 86.
‡ Baxt. p. 165. § Watts, p. 63.

Solid *extenſion*, and a cogitative power, are real ſubſtances, for if we nullify them they leave mere nothing behind them.*

Page 86, *laſt line. But here*, &c.—Here Mr. Locke ſuppoſes that ſenſation implies thinking as much as it implies perception, which, I conceive, is quite wrong, (vide Baxt. p. 90.) Muſt it not appear more wonderful to work a piece of mechaniſm in the bounds of a flea or mite, than in the bounds of an horſe or elephant? Theſe animalcula are therefore as great inſtances of the wiſdom and power of God, as the largeſt living creatures. Again, does not this mechaniſm as much require an external immaterial mover, as any mechaniſm whatever, and who ſupplies this? laſtly, they move ſpontaneouſly. The objection ſuppoſes this: ſpontaneous motion is different from mechanical motion by the terms; therefore it muſt require a different immaterial principle. And where is the difficulty in all this? Or rather in what particular is it not demonſtrative. †

To ſuppoſe immortality founded on immateriality is extremely wrong. The human ſoul being rational, and the brute ſoul not, the one a moral agent, and the other not, is the foundation of a very conſiſtent and ſolid diſtinction between the one and the other as to immortality.‡

Page 88, *line* 17. *But if you mean, &c.*—Mr. Locke hath well obſerved, that they are different conſiderations that prove the ſoul immortal and immaterial; but when he ſays, *that it is* as evident to him, that brutes reaſon in ſome inſtances as that they have ſenſe (l. 2. c. 11, § 11.) and here takes it for granted that it is but *mere matter with ſuperadded properties* that thus

* Watts, p. 56.

† Vide Baxt. p. 3, 6, N. Keil's Introduct. ad Phyſ. lect. 5: Vide p. 120, v. 1. Bp. Br. on the Und. p. 173. Baxt. p. 108. Burnet Demonſt. p. 92.

‡ Baxt. p. 108, N.

reaſons,

reaſons, tho' he offers no proof of either of theſe aſſertions; and ſince all men ſuppoſe the matter of the brute body finally diſſipated at death, this gives an ignorant ſceptic courage to affirm that it may be ſo with the human ſoul. It is by no means commendable in Mr. Locke (who allows the ſoul to be immaterial, yet contends it might have been material) to maintain a point that hath ſo bad a tendency, gratis, and barely for maintaining's ſake.*

They who run the parallel between the human ſoul and that of brutes, ſuppoſe ſtill the ſame powers in both; but ſurely rationality muſt be founded in ſome power which the brute ſoul as ſuch has not: but granting the activity of the brute ſoul, when ſeparated, this would not certainly infer the human ſoul is unactive and impercipient after death, but rather conclude the contrary the more ſtrongly, and perhaps do no diſſervice to philoſophy!†

§ *page* 97 *line* 7. *The word ſpirit.*—But with ſubmiſſion, I think no man ever before defended the propriety of an expreſſion, excluſive of the truth of it, in a philoſophical controverſy. If the acceptation of a word is ſuch as determines the queſtion; without farther argument, as in this caſe, to juſtify the propriety of it then, is to make the common uſe of language decide in points of philoſophy. If Cicero or Virgil had wrong ideas as to the immateriality of the ſoul, tho' they expreſſed theſe wrong ideas right, that does not mend the matter. The diſpute between the biſhop and Mr Locke was, whether matter could think, and not the claſſical acceptation of the word *ſpiritus*.‡

Page 103, *line* 1. *It being impoſſible for us, &c.*—This is founded upon what Mr. Locke elſewhere endeavours to

* Baxt. p. 87. † Vid. Baxt. p. 156. ‡ Baxt. p. 98.

maintain, viz. that our ideas are only *arbitrary* combinations, without connexion to any thing in nature.*

§ 7, *page* 106. All knowledge, or the certainty of the truth of any propoſition, is founded upon a tacit conſtant ſuppoſition both of the truth of our ſenſes and faculties and of the *real exiſtence and real relation* between thoſe things which are affirmed and denied of each other, and not of their agreement or diſagreement in *idea* only.†

§ 16. *page* 110. Tho' our knowledge of ſubſtances is not adequate, yet if our ſenſes and faculties be right, (which muſt be ſuppoſed in intuitive and demonſtrative knowledge) then ſo far as any man's experience reaches, 'tis as certain and real knowledge as what the author calls *intuitive* and *demonſtrative*.‡

§ 18, *page* 111. I take this to comprehend all the four ſorts which the author mentions; but by relative knowledge he means only the relation of numbers, lines, figures, angles to each other, which is known by demonſtration, and perhaps alſo of *abſtract ideas* in morality, which can be of no uſe if in *idea* only, without being applied to things without us.§

§ 18, *page* 112, *line* 31. *Where, &c.*—*Ibid. line* 40. *No government, &c.*—The two propoſitions here mentioned are certainly true, but of no manner of uſe, becauſe the ſenſe of them is *identical,* amounting to no more than this, *where there is no right, there is no unrighteouſneſs; and every government governs.*‖

§ 21, *page* 116. If a man doubts of the exiſtence of the things he ſees and feels, there is no third idea, but will need a fourth, nor fourth, but will ſtand as much in need of a fifth, to prove its own exiſtence, and ſo *in infinitum*; endleſs ſcepticiſm.*

§ 23, *page* 117, *line* 6. Want of *ideas* is want of *knowledge* or want of nothing; and want of knowledge is but another phraſe for ignorance, and differs no otherwiſe than the want of light does from darkneſs; the cauſes of ignorance therefore more properly aſſign'd to the *diſtance* or *minuteneſs* of ſome bodies.†

§ 28, *page* 122. This is not the cauſe of our ignorance, but the very ignorance itſelf, is the imperfection of our faculties that we complain of.†

§ 30, *page* 124. Some men are apt to aſſign another reaſon for this, viz. becauſe many intereſts, luſts, and paſſions are more apt to mix in other diſcourſes than merely in mathematics; and till all men's intereſts become the ſame, which is impracticable in this world, there would be differences in men's judgements, tho' they were never ſo well agreed in the ſignification of words.§

* Baxt. p. p. 86, p. 107. † Lee, p. 250. ‡ Lee, p. 251.
§ Lee, p. 252. ‖ Lee, p. 253.

CHAP. IV.

On the Reality of Knowledge.

§ 3, *page* 127. BUT this very *conformity* is not diſcoverable in any caſe whatever merely by *ideas*.—There is nothing diſtinct from the power of the object, and the perceptions in the mind, and conſequently their *conformity* to the reality of the things, or the real power in the objects, cannot be diſcovered for want of ſome *real third* thing to make that diſcovery.

* Lee, p 253. † Ibid. p. 254. § Lee. p. 255.

§ 7, *page* 129. Mixt modes and relations are arbitrary combinations of ideas made without regard to any particular ſubject in which they may in here; they are evidently their own archetypes, and therefore cannot but be real and poſitive. They are what they are immutably and univerſally; their natures and eſſences muſt be the ſame wherever they are found, ſo long as the ſame number of ideas are included under the ſame word.*

Ibid. The general names of virtues and vices are the ſigns of the mind, obſerving ſuch relation to the declared will of God, or our governors, and not the ſigns of any ſuch fictions as general or *abſtract ideas*, for there are none ſuch in the world.†

§ 8, *page* 129. But this knowledge is neither true, real, certain, nor uſeful; not true, becauſe truth is the connexion of things by words or other ſigns really connected or disjoined; not *certain*, becauſe if things be barely poſſible, as is ſuppoſed in this caſe, the knowledge can riſe no higher in degree than the poſſibility of the connexion or disjunction, and that's far enough from certainty; not *real*, becauſe if the archetypes be more accurate than any thing without the mind, they are ſo far at leaſt not real; nor *uſeful*, becauſe if the ideas of actions are beyond any that are or ever were, and the ideas of lines, &c. more exact than any copies of them in bodies are, or ever were, they are not applicable to bodies, and conſequently do not anſwer the end of knowledge, which is uſefulneſs.‡

Ibid. Nor are Tully's Offices leſs true.—But *Tully's offices* are no farther *true* than 'tis poſſible for any one to obſerve them; and no one can rationally judge any thing is poſſible, that is not, nor ever was done, but by *ſpecial revelation.*§

* Note on K. p. 7 † Lee, p. 258. ‡ Ibid. 159.
§ Ibid.

Since

Since moſt, &c.—But all the general propoſitions that I know are certain and real, are founded on a ſuppoſed real, not an imaginary exiſtence.*

§ 9, *page* 131, *line* 13. *Juſt the ſame is it in moral knowledge.*—The caſe is not altogether the ſame, becauſe the eſſence of a triangle, &c. is its real properties, and thoſe will be unalterable indeed; but if the nominal and real eſſence of virtues and vices be the ſame (as according to the author's principles they are) then if a man alters the name he alters the eſſence in his own judgement; but 'tis otherwiſe in figures, &c.†

§ *page* 132, *line* 5. *Such are our ideas.*—But notwithſtanding this pretended defect, all the real or certain knowledge we have or can have in this world is only of ſubſtances, and their modes on which their relation to us or one another is founded.‡

§ 12, *page* 132. But after all, what he calls ſubſtances are not ſubſtances. Men, gold, iron, &c. are not ſubſtances, but only the common names, the individuals only are real ſubſtances.§

§ 12, *page* 132. A changeling is a particular ſpecies of man, juſt as a perſon of a ſurprizing genius or extraordinary wiſdom is a particular ſpecies of man in the other extreme. Man, is a common name, and every one will give names not according to what things really are in all particulars, but only what they ſeem to be: and therefore a changeling has the eſſence of a man, if by the word eſſence be meant the like properties or qualities by which it may be diſtinguiſhed from every thing elſe that has not the ſame common name; but if by the word eſſence be meant the ſame individual properties and quality, in that ſenſe it is not the ſame eſſence any

* Lee, p. 159 † Ibid. p. 260. ‡ Ibid. 260. § Ibid. p. 261.

more than two men, or two guineas have the ſame eſſence.*

What properties are viſible thoſe we know, and give them the common name of man, becauſe we know no better, as we call guineas gold, becauſe they are yellow and weighty, tho' they may want, for what we know, the property of being ſoluble *in aqua regia* †

§ 16, *page* 136. As for monſtrous births we judge them a ſort of creatures between man and beaſt, becauſe they partake of the ſhape and features of both, and therefore eſteem them the product of unnatural mixtures.‡

CHAP V.

Of Truth in General.

§ 2, *page* 136. THE common definition of truth is the conjunction or disjunction of things according to the real relation thoſe things have to each other. A mental truth or true mental propoſition is, when our thoughts agree with the real relation which the things have to each other of which we think; and a verbal truth is, when the things themſelves have that relation really with the words of which they are made the ſigns agree or diſagree; whereas in our notion of truth, 'tis the agreement or diſagreement only in ideas or words.§

§ 4, *page* 139. The beſt way to come at mental propoſitions is to conſider what actions there could be in our minds, if we were born and continued deaf and dumb all our days, which is the caſe of ſome: that ſuch affirm and deny or diſcern the agreement and diſagreement of things ſo far as their obſervation reaches,

* Lee, p. 262. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid. p. 264.

there

there is no doubt; and thoſe are properly mental propoſitions, and are true when their thoughts agree or diſagree with the real relation there is between the things they think of.*

CHAP. VI.

Of Univerſal Propoſitions, their Truth and Certainty.

§ 5, *page* 146. GENERAL propoſitions may be as certainly known to be true about ſubſtances as mathematical propoſitions. I am as ignorant of all the properties belonging to triangles, &c. as I am of all the active or paſſive powers of lead and gold: but what I know of lead or gold, or other ſubſtances, or ſo far as my experience goes, I know as certainly as I do any thing of thoſe or any ſort of figures, and can form as many true, certain, and univerſal propoſitions concerning them.

CHAP. VII.

Of Maxims.

§ 8, *page* 161. THEY are ſaid to be *præcognitis & præconceſſis*, becauſe the actions of children and ideots ſeem to be governed by them, even before they can pronounce the words in which they are expreſſed.

§ 9, *page* 162. Children know pleaſure and pain, &c. before they know their names, or form propoſitions about them; yet I gueſs they don't in their minds play with abſtract ideas like babies, before they know that pleaſure is pleaſure, or pain is pain, &c. and yet

* Lee, p. 265.

that knowledge is but that every thing is the ſame with itſelf and not another; and when they grow old enough to be philoſophers, they don't need to be taught thoſe truths any more than that a ſtranger is not their mother, &c. and that is all we mean by ſaying, theſe truths are *innate*.*

§ 11, *page* 165. The main uſe of theſe maxims is, for the ſolving leſs obvious or more general propoſitions into ſuch obvious and univerſally acknowledged principles.†

Ibid. page 169, *line* 34. *They ſometimes ſerve in argumentation to ſtop a wrangler's mouth.*—But if they ſtop wranglers mouths 'tis ſomething; for that they would not do, if they were not the avowed principles of all the world; and as for bringing a man into any new knowledge, no body pretends any more than confirming him in the old, which otherwiſe they might want: and as for *influencing identical predications*, this I take to be a juſt and great encomium of them; for all the certainly true propoſitions in the world are not clearly perceived to be ſuch till they are reſolved into ſuch identity or the negation of it.‡

§ 13, *page* 172. But all this while there is no fault in the maxims, but in the manner of probation; for in both caſes the queſtion is ſuppoſed, that which ſhould be proved is firſt granted, and at that rate there is no need of maxims or ideas either.§

§ 18, *page* 175. But all this would have been ſaved by giving only ſome different appellation or the common name; *ex. gr.* as if the child had ſaid, that a negro is not a white man; or that changelings are not rational: or that the third was a new ſort of rational

* Lee, p. 274. † Ibid. p. 275. ‡ Ibid. p. 274. § Ibid. p. 275.

creature. The maxims had none of theſe wild inferences, but they are all the natural ſpawn of *abſtract complex ideas:* and, therefore, notwithſtanding theſe objections againſt maxims, they are of ſingular uſe in the ready proof of ſuch propoſitions as are not diſcoverable by our ſenſes where ſenſible ideas are not to be had, and that's the utmoſt we pretend. *Ex. gr.* We have no idea of the air, of animal ſpirits, or of God, yet are certain of their exiſtence, by reſolving our arguments into that maxim, *every effect muſt have a cauſe.* But of cauſe and effect we have no abſtract general ideas, they are only general relative words or names.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of Trifling Propoſitions.

§ 2, *page* 177. IT muſt be confeſſed that all *identical propoſitions* do not ſhew him that uſes them, or make another wiſer than he was ſuppoſed to be before: they only direct the attention of what he himſelf or the other ſaid or thought before, in order to the making himſelf or the other wiſer.—Words barely repeated are no propoſition at all, 'tis the act of the mind apprehending that relation of the thing to itſelf that makes the propoſition, and this is all that is pretended.†

§ 4, *page* 180. Such propoſitions are verbal indeed, the predicates are but explications of the ſubjects, but they are not the leſs inſtructive for being ſo. He that knows all the properties of thoſe individuals that have the names of man or lead, need not to be informed that one is an animal, and the other a metal: but it is poſſible a perſon may have heard the words of animal and metal, and underſtand them, and yet not

* Lee, p. 276. † Ibid. p. 277.

have heard or underſtood the ſignification of man or lead; and to ſuch a one this is a ſhort way of informing him, and conſequently one method of improving knowledge.*

§ 7, *page* 192. If we invert the places of the ſubjects in theſe propoſitions (if it be true, that every man has a notion of God, then it is the property of that idea to be formed in the minds of men: and if it be true that every man can be caſt into ſleep by opium, then that is the property of opium:) it will appear, the predicate contains no more than the ſubjects; ſo that either thoſe two propoſitions are falſe, and conſequently not inſtructive, or elſe they are as trifling as any before-mentioned.†

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Exiſtence.

§ 1, *page* 186. 1. THE *eſſences* of things are only the names of that which diſtinguiſhes one thing from another.

2. They are not the abſtract ideas of things, becauſe there are none ſuch in the mind but of viſible ſubſtances.

3. They are not made by us, but only the names of them from the ſeveral qualities or properties.

4. Exiſtence is concerned in the eſſence of things, becauſe we cannot conceive the one without the other.

5. General propoſitions do not concern exiſtence, they being only the conjunction or disjunction of common names given to particular things, which are ſuppoſed by the mind to exiſt.

6. Particular propoſitions, though they likewiſe concern exiſtence, yet do not declare the accidental union or ſeparation of ideas, but the real relation that

* Lee, p. 277. † Ibid. p. 278.

is

is between ſubſtances and their modes, or between them and ourſelves.*

7. The knowledge of our own exiſtence is that of the real relation there is between a man's ſelf and his own thoughts, and not the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ideas, becauſe in this caſe there can be no ideas diſtinct from the perſon himſelf and his own thoughts.†

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Exiſtence of a God.

§ 2, *page* 188. THE author, in one of his letters to the Biſhop, ſays, he has waved the uſe of the word idea in this argument, on purpoſe to let it into men's minds, by common words, or known ways of expreſſion.—But I doubt a better reaſon might be given, viz. that the ideal phraſe would render it obſcure, and as far as poſſible make it doubtful: for

The reaſon why any one is convinced of his own exiſtence, is, becauſe he is immediately conſcious of his own thoughts; but of thoſe thoughts he can have no idea, becauſe they neither agree nor diſagree, but as the objects or cauſe of them do: and therefore it is this agreement or diſagreement ariſing from the variety of cauſes or objects that ſatisfies a man of his own exiſtence, and not the agreement of the idea of himſelf with the abſtract idea of exiſtence, for of that barely he would have no idea or perception at all.‡

§ 3, *page* 188. Is there any idea of nothing in a man's mind? The mind can indeed by its natural power ſuppoſe any cauſe to ſuſpend or withdraw its efficacy, and by its natural powers perceive where

* Lee, p. 280. † Ibid ‡ Ibid. p. 286.

there is no real cauſe operating, there can be no real effect; but by this inſtance it may appear there are principles of reaſon, where there can be no perception of the agreement or diſagreement of ideas; for nothing is the negation of all ideas.

§ 4, *page* 189. This is an identical propoſition, and therefore trifling: for being and exiſtence is one and the ſame to the mind, with the properties of the thing exiſting; it is the ſame as to ſay, *what has its beginning from another, has its beginning from another*, and therefore the knowledge of this is not the agreement, &c. becauſe they are in effect but one idea; what makes it a propoſition is the mind's comparing that thing with itſelf, as it is in all certainly true, affirmative, identical propoſitions.

§ 5, *Ibid.* But not from the agreement between the idea of himſelf and the idea of perception and knowledge; becauſe he can have no idea of perception or knowledge diſtinct from the knowledge or perception; to know or perceive is all one, as having an idea, unleſs an idea be ſomething that is neither in nor out of the mind.

Ibid. But as we cannot ſeparate the knowledge of exiſtence from that of the things that do or have exiſted, it is the perception of real relation between the things themſelves, and not the comparing the abſtract idea of one time with that of another; becauſe there are no ſuch ideas, they are all pure nothing.*

* Lee, p. 286.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Exiſtence of other Things.

§ 3, *page* 200. BUT I cannot conceive how we ſhould have either intuitive or rational knowledge without ſuppoſing the exiſtence of things without us, unleſs there could be thoughts of nothing, or reaſoning about nothing.*

§ 13, *page* 207. But neither of theſe ſort of propoſitions can be known, but upon ſuppoſition of the truth of our ſenſes.†

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

§ 5, *page* 212. BUT it is as dangerous to deny all principles as to embrace falſe ones.‡

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgement.

§ 4, *page* 224. THE common account is, that knowing when it is not uſed for a ſimple apprehenſion, is the perception of the neceſſary or immutable relation between any things propoſed to the mind. And judging is the perception of that relation between things, whether that relation be immutable and neceſſary, or mutable and ſeparable.§

Judgement is that operation of the mind whereby we join two or more ideas together by one affirmation

* Lee, p. 302. † Ibid. p. 293. ‡ Ibid p. 295. § Ibid. p. 302.

or negation; this tree is high, that horſe is not ſwift, &c. which ſentences are the effect of judgement, and are called propoſitions.*

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

§ 2, *page* 226. PROBABILITY does not ſupply the defect of knowledge; for even in the loweſt degree of it, there is ſome knowledge or certainty, but rather ſupplies the want of evidence to make any thing fully known or certain.†

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reaſon.

§ 3, *page* 242. THE common definition of reaſon is, that it is the faculty in the mind which infers the truth or falſehood of any propoſition by its perception of the mutable or immutable relation between the parts of that, and other propoſitions with which it is compared.

The difference is, that of the four degrees or offices of this faculty, others reckon that of making the inference or concluſion to be the chief or only proper exerciſe of reaſon.‡

Ibid. Diſpoſition is the ranging our thoughts in ſuch order, as is beſt for our own and others conception and memory. The effect of this operation is called method.§

§ 4, *Ibid.* There is no one doubts, but the queſtion is, whether ſuch men do not in their diſcourſes make ſyllogiſms, though they never heard the word,

* Watts Log. p. 5. † Lee, p. 304. ‡ Ibid. 313.
§ Watts Log. p. 6.

or

or their diſcourſes would not be as intelligible, or when they do not, they are not longer looſer and obſcurer.

§ 4, *page* 251. But in all diſputations the defendant may be required to explain his terms, if obſcure, and fallacious, and if that be done this argument fails, or if it has any ſtrength, it would be as valid againſt all ſorts of diſcourſe and conferences, for they are no leſs liable to the ambiguity of words than ſyllogiſtical form.*

§ 5, *page* 252. This is likewiſe the common practice in all ſorts of conferences; if any one pretends to maintain any probable propoſition, he that oppoſes it will make uſe of his ſtrongeſt arguments and attack it in the weakeſt part, &c.†

§ 6, *Ibid. The rules of ſyllogiſm ſerve not to furniſh the mind with thoſe intermediate ideas that may ſhew the connection of remote ones.*—'Tis true, he that uſes a ſyllogiſm muſt find out the middle term himſelf. The form of placing his words won't do that: the queſtion only is, whether that which he has prepared to ſay or write would not be as well or better expreſſed, in as few, and that as intelligible, in the form of a ſyllogiſm, as any other form of words.‡

§ 8, *page* 254. In this ſection I conceive there is a miſtake about the rules of ſyllogiſms, and a contradiction to his whole ſcheme of abſtract general ideas. For, 1ſt, There are rules of ſyllogiſms where every propoſition is particular, and the concluſion right. This paper has a plain and regular ſuperficies; this pen has not ſo, *ergo*, their figures are different. 2dly, If it be true, as I think it is, that every idea is a par-

* Watts Log. p. 314. † Ibid. p. 315. ‡ Ibid.

ticular exiſtence, then there can be no general abſtract ideas. If, *ex. gr.* whiteneſs and triumph be ideas, then they are ideas only of a particular white body, and a particular triumph, and therefore all that he muſt mean by general abſtract ideas, muſt be only the general names given to particulars, unleſs there could be ideas that are both general and particular, which I cannot comprehend.*

§ 14, *page* 257. Intuitive knowledge is no knowledge at all, but on ſuppoſition of the real exiſtence of things without us, which is contrary to his method and meaning.†

§ 15, *Ibid.* Nor is demonſtrative knowledge certain, but upon the like ſuppoſition.‡

§ 16, *page* 259. The author ſeems to have too much limited this faculty as he has that of rational knowledge, which is commonly extended to all ſuch knowledge which leaves no room for a rational doubt, as in the caſe of human teſtimony, when certain; of divine, when vouched by miracles.§

§ 20, *page* 260. When the argument is drawn from any inſufficient medium whatſoever, and yet the oppoſer has not ſkill to refute or anſwer it; this is *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.*

§ 21, *Ibid.* St. Paul often uſes this *argumentum ad hominem* when he reaſons with the Jews, and when he ſays, I ſpeak as a man.

§ 22, *Ibid.* If an argument be taken from the nature and exiſtence of things, or addreſſed to the

* Lee, p. 316. † Ibid. p. 318. ‡ Ibid. § Ibid. p. 319.

reaſon of mankind, 'tis called *Argumentum ad Judicium.*

Beſides theſe Dr. Watts reckons *Argumentum ad Fidem,* when it is borrowed from ſome convincing teſtimony.

Argumentum ad Paſſiones, or *ad Populum,* when an argument is borrowed from any topics which are ſuited to engage the inclinations and paſſions of the hearers on the ſide of the ſpeaker, rather than convince the judgement.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reaſon and their diſtinct Provinces.

§ 2, *page* 263. FAITH is the aſſent of the mind to any propoſitions where the relation between its parts is not diſcoverable by the uſe of our natural faculties, but the reaſon of the aſſent is divine teſtimony.

§ 3, *Ibid.* We are apt to think, that if God pleaſes by immediate revelation to give to any perſons the knowledge of ſuch objects or greater degrees of thoſe ſenſations, that he can furniſh thoſe perſons with power by words or other ſigns to produce the like ideas or perceptions in others, which were communicated in the original revelation. But this, if granted poſſible, as there is not the leaſt reaſon to deny, yet will not, I confeſs, amount to the forming new ſimple ideas; but there is no need of it, for the modes of ſubſtances which we know already are capable of an infinite variety in degrees and mixtures, and the words we have equally capable of being formed into an infinite number of propoſitions, ſo that in order to make divine or ſupernatural diſcoveries, there will no need of more

* Watts Log. p. 311.

organ of ſenſe, of new words, or new modes of ſubſtances: and why God ſhould not be able to repreſent a new ſcene of things to the imagination, as we find it daily by men in the deſcription of foreign animals, plants, &c. is to me unaccountable. St. Paul does not ſay they were ſuch degrees of pleaſure that he had no conception of, or were incommunicable to others; but the contrary, in the words following: God hath revealed them to us by his ſpirit.*

§ 4, *page* 265. But this muſt be limited to traditional revelation only, for it ſeems too great a reſtraint of the Divine Power to ſuppoſe God cannot make the coherence of the parts of any propoſition as plain to any one's mind immediately, as by his external ſenſes, and there is no doubt but the inſpired prophets had as clear a view of paſt and future events as if they had ſeen them.†

§ 5, *page* 266. But,* 1ſt, It is to be conſidered, whether a perſon's own probity may not be as certainly known to himſelf, as any ideas he can have in his mind: or whether a perſon's knowledge that he has the power of working miracles may not as thoroughly convince him that his revelation comes from God, as any rational deductions whatever can ſatisfy him of any ſort of truth.

2dly. It ſeems derogatory to the Divine Power, that it ſhould not extend ſo far as to make any thing plain by words or other ſigns, by lively impreſſions upon the imagination of the perſon inſpired, as the perſon himſelf can by his own ſenſes, or uſe of his natural faculties.‡

§ 6, *page* 267. But if Divine Revelation be the only object of Divine Faith, and no revelation can be

* Lee, p. 324. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. p. 327.

ſufficiently

ſufficiently known to come from God but either by ſeeing ſome inſpired perſon writing, or hearing him to ſpeak, or ſome other perſon vouching every particular miracle, then the Holy Scriptures can afford us no ſecure ground for divine faith, which is carrying the point too far: for, 1ſt, It is not plain, that *faith has to do, &c.* for I cannot ſee a reaſon why the laws of nature may not be called divine laws, and aſſent given to ſome propoſition of divine faith, for it is ſuppoſed there are ſeveral propoſitions worthy of a rational aſſent, and yet are the objects of a divine faith only for their being farther confirmed by revelation; as the immortality of the ſoul; ſo that rational aſſent and divine faith ſeem to differ only or chiefly in the degrees of evidence, and make no manner of alteration in the reaſon of human actions.*

* Lee, p. 327.

FINIS.