

THE
WORKS
OF
JOHN LOCKE.

A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED.

IN TEN VOLUMES.

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CHAPTER V.

OF TRUTH IN GENERAL.

SECT.

1. What truth is.
2. A right joining or separating of signs; *i. e.* ideas or words.
3. Which make mental or verbal propositions.
4. Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of.
5. Being nothing but joining or separating ideas, without words.
6. When mental propositions contain real truth, and when verbal.
7. Objection against verbal truth, that thus it may be all chimerical.
8. Answered, real truth is about ideas agreeing to things.
9. Falseness is the joining of names, otherwise than their ideas agree.
10. General propositions to be treated of more at large.
11. Moral and metaphysical truth.

CHAPTER VI.

OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS, THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY.

SECT.

1. Treating of words, necessary to knowledge.
2. General truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal propositions.
3. Certainty two-fold, of truth, and of knowledge.
4. No proposition can be known to be true, where the essence of each species mentioned is not known.
5. This more particularly concerns substances.
6. The truth of few universal propositions concerning substances is to be known.

7. Because co-existence of ideas in few cases is to be known.
- 8, 9. Instance in gold.
10. As far as any such co-existence can be known, so far universal propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because,
- 11, 12. The qualities, which make our complex ideas of substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived causes.
13. Judgment may reach farther, but that is not knowledge.
14. What is requisite for our knowledge of substances.
15. Whilst our ideas of substances contain not their real constitutions, we can make but few general, certain propositions concerning them.
16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions.

CHAPTER VII.

OF MAXIMS.

SECT.

1. They are self-evident.
2. Wherein that self-evidence consists.
3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms.
4. First, as to identity and diversity, all propositions are equally self-evident.
5. Secondly, in co-existence, we have few self-evident propositions.
6. Thirdly, in other relations we may have.
7. Fourthly, concerning real existence, we have none.
8. These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge.
9. Because they are not the truths the first known.
10. Because on them the other parts of our knowledge do not depend.
11. What use these general maxims have.
12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of words, may prove contradictions.
13. Instance in vacuum.
14. They prove not the existence of things without us.
15. Their application dangerous about complex ideas.
- 16—18. Instance in man.
19. Little use of these maxims, in proofs, where we have clear and distinct ideas.
20. Their use dangerous, where our ideas are confused.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.

SECT.

1. Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge.
- 2, 3. As, first, identical propositions.

4. Secondly, when a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole.
5. As part of the definition of the term defined.
6. Instance, man and palfry.
7. For this teaches but the signification of words.
8. But no real knowledge.
9. General propositions, concerning substances, are often trifling.
10. And why.
11. Thirdly, using words variously, is trifling with them.
12. Marks of verbal propositions. First, predication in abstract.
13. Secondly, a part of the definition, predicated of any term.

CHAPTER IX.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.

SECT.

1. General, certain propositions concern not existence.
2. A threefold knowledge of existence.
3. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.

SECT.

1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God.
2. Man knows that he himself is.
3. He knows also, that nothing cannot produce a being, therefore something eternal.
4. That eternal being must be most powerful.
5. And most knowing.
6. And therefore God.
7. Our idea of a most perfect being, not the sole proof of a God.
8. Something from eternity.
9. Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative.
10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative.
- 11, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal wisdom.
13. Whether material or no.
14. Not material, first, because every particle of matter is not cogitative.
15. Secondly, one particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative.
16. Thirdly, a system of incogitative matter cannot be cogitative.
17. Whether in motion or at rest.
- 18, 19. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS.

SECT.

1. Is to be had only by sensation.
2. Instance, whiteness of this paper.

